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TRANSFER PRICING IN VAT/GST VS. DIRECT TAXATION:
A PAPER ON THE TOPIC OF RELATIONS BETWEEN ASSOCIATED COMPANIES
Richard T. Ainsworth
Two caveats open this paper, one dealing with the scope of analysis, the other with the
results we are expecting.
First, the scope of this inquiry needs to be broadened. Even though the topic asks that we
limit ourselves to VAT/GST and direct taxes, in most jurisdictions there are three (not two)
spheres of transfer pricing analysis – income tax, customs and VAT/GST. Although they share
policy objectives, terminology and frequently borrow methodologies from one another, these
domestic transfer pricing regimes rarely operate in complete harmony. In addition, compared
with customs and income tax, VATs/GSTs are newcomers to transfer pricing. As a result,
VAT/GST statutes tend to borrow in both directions (from income tax and customs).
Secondly, what do we hope to achieve? The short answer is we are looking for
harmonization. The more difficult question is: are we looking for vertical harmonization (similar
or identical transfer pricing rules among these taxes within a single jurisdiction); horizontal
harmonization (similar or identical rules applied in each tax among multiple jurisdictions); or
both? If the short term answer is the first (vertical harmonization), and the long term answer is
the last (both vertical and horizontal harmonization), what we soon discover is that many of our
most difficult problems stem from the success we have had in advancing the middle position
(horizontal harmonization within each tax type).
The GATT Valuation Code (GVC)1 provides a single set of valuation rules used in over
150 countries, but it is limited to goods. The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines2 are
considerably more detailed that the GVC, but they are not as widely followed.3 The WCO and
1

The GATT Valuation Code (GVC) sets out customs rules that govern valuation of related-party transactions.
Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 included in THE
FINAL ACT EMBODYING THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, April
15, 1994.
2
OECD, TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND TAX ADMINISTRATIONS, looseleaf
1995. The influence of the OECD in establishing transfer price rules in global income tax regimes has been indirect,
but comprehensive. The arm’s length standard is included in Article 9 of the OECD’s Model Tax Convention
[OECD, Committee of Fiscal Affairs, MODEL TAX CONVENTIONS ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL, June 1998].
3
There are roughly 33 countries with developed transfer pricing regimes in income tax. They are Argentina,
Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China (PRC), Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Italy, Ireland, Japan, Kazakhstan, Luxembourg,
Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Singapore,
Slovak Republic, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Ukraine, United
Kingdom, United States, and Venezuela. ERNST & YOUNG, TRANSFER PRICING GLOBAL REFERENCE GUIDE
(February 2006) available at
http://www.ey.com/global/download.nsf/Austria/transfer_pricing_guide_06/$file/GlobalTPGuide_Feb06.pdf. The
Ernst and Young survey determines that a jurisdiction has a robust income tax transfer pricing system, if it is one
with significant documentation requirements. In other jurisdictions rules may be in place, but they function more in
an anti-avoidance context, not a regular compliance context. A more “liberal” counting of jurisdictions would
increase the number to approximately fifty countries. CYM H. LOWELL, RICHARD HAMMER, & MARC LEVEY,
INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER PRICING: OECD GUIDELINES ¶ 10.05 (2007).
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OECD have long been aware that their transfer pricing rules are out of sync with one another:
Conferences were held as recently as May 3-4, 2006,4 May 22-23, 2007,5 and October 20, 20086
on this issue.
This is the context within which we need to consider the harmonization of transfer
pricing rules in VAT/GST and direct taxation. Some of the notable highpoints and the questions
they raise are:
•

•

•

•

TRANSFER PRICING AT THE BORDER – All countries with a VAT/GST apply
customs transfer pricing rules to determine the value of imported goods. Are we
anticipating two transfer pricing regimes in VAT/GST – one for goods (for the importer
of record) at the border that will follow customs, and another for all other related party
transactions (other goods transactions and all services) which would align with direct tax
rules?
RELATIONSHIPS – ASSOCIATED ENTERPRISES – Most VAT/GST jurisdictions
determine “related parties” by borrowing (in detail) the definitions used by customs (from
the GVC). A significant minority however, define “related parties” differently,
harmonizing instead with rules borrowed from in their income tax statute. Both of these
approaches are generally compatible with the broad description of “associated
enterprises” referenced in the OECD Guidelines. However, general adoption of the
OECD Guidelines will not resolve the deeper conflicts among specific approaches. Will
the resolution of this issue necessarily include uncoupling VAT/GST transfer pricing
from the GVC at the place where it is most commonly used today – the border?
METHODS – Most VAT/GST jurisdictions do not specify transfer pricing methods,
with the exception of near universally stated preference for a comparable uncontrolled
price (CUP) method. Most jurisdictions that discuss pricing methods do so in very
general terms and appear to limit acceptable methods to the “traditional,” transactionbased methods. Very few VAT/GST jurisdictions mention profit methods, and those that
do so have borrowed methods wholesale from the OECD Guidelines. Are we
anticipating the general adoption of OECD methods in VAT/GST, or will new methods
to determine prices be designed?
TIME - There is a natural affinity between VAT/GST transfer pricing principles and
those developed in customs law. Both of these taxes are transaction-based, and the tax
base for both needs to be determined relatively soon after completing a transaction. Diect
taxes are based on annual measures, and transfer pricing adjustments are frequently made
much later in time. Are we anticipating a harmonization where direct tax adjustments in
valuation are rolled back to prior VAT/GST determinations?
TRANSFER PRICING AT THE BORDER

4

WCO/OECD CONFERENCE ON TRANSFER PRICING AND CUSTOMS VALUATION at
http://www.oecd.org/document/39/0,2340,en_2649_201185_36541927_1_1_1_1,00.html
5
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON TRANSFER PRICING AND CUSTOMS VALUATION at
http://www.oecd.org/document/39/0,3343,en_2649_201185_36541927_1_1_1_1,00.html
6
WCO TECHNICAL COMMITTEE ON CUSTOMS VALUATION, 27th Meeting (Oct. 20, 2008) powerpoint presentations
on file with author.
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VAT/GST valuations in all jurisdictions follow customs valuation when VAT/GST is
imposed on importation of goods. As a result, because customs valuation under the GVC is not
harmonized with the OECD Guidelines the VAT/GST base at the border is inconsistent with the
valuation results for the same goods under direct taxation. In other words, the rule in the EU7
that establishes this disharmony can be found in any of the world’s VAT/GST jurisdictions.
Take for example the rules in countries like Albania,8 Armenia,9 Bangladesh,10 Japan, 11 and
Russia.12 Is there a solution?
Canada may offer a direction. Canada expressly ties GST valuation for goods at the
border to the customs value,13 but it goes one step further. It provides a mechanism for
harmonizing the valuation measures of all three taxes at the border. The Canadian Revenue
Authority (CRA) in Memorandum D13-4-5 indicates that it will accept an OECD-based
valuation of goods (a direct tax measure of value) as the transaction value (a customs measure of

7

SIXTH COUNCIL DIRECTIVE of 17 May 1977on the harmonization of the laws of the Member States relating to
turnover tax – Common system of value added tax: uniform basis of assessment (77/388/EEC) 1977 O.J. (L 145) 1,
Art. 11(B)(1). On November 28, 2006 the SIXTH COUNCIL DIRECTIVE was repealed and replaced with the RECAST
VAT DIRECTIVE (RVD). The parallel citation is: Council Directive 2006/112/EC on the Common system of value
added tax, O.J. (L 347) 1, Art. 85. Dual citations (to the old and recast versions of the Sixth Directive) will be used
throughout this document.
8
VALUE ADDED TAX, Law No. 7928, Art.26(1) & (2) (indicating that customs valuation methods apply in VAT with
respect to imports) (1995) (Albania).
9
LAW ON VALUE ADDED TAX, Art 8(2) (indicating that customs valuation methods apply in VAT with respect to
imports) (1997) (Armenia).
10
ADDED VALUE TAX, 1991, Act No. 22, Art 5(1) (indicating that customs valuation methods apply in VAT with
respect to imports) (1991) (Bangladesh).
11
JAPAN’S REVISED CONSUMPTION TAX LAW (SHOUHIZEIHOU), Art. 28(2) LAW NO. 108, 1988, AND
APPENDIXES by approving the changes contained in LAW NO. 49, 2000; CABINET ORDER (SHOUHIZEIHOU
SEKOUREI) NO. 360, 1988 (most recent amendment, ORDER NO. 147, 2000 available at: http://law.egov.go.jp/cgi-bin/idxsearch.cgi. (in Japanese). For an English translation of the Consumption Tax law based on
Law No. 108, 1988 by approving changes contained in Law No. 49, 2000 see: Consumption Tax Law, tr. Vickie L.
Beyer, 2000 WTD 247-20 (December 22, 2000). For a translation of the appendixes to Japan’s revised consumption
tax law, Law No. 108 see: Translation of Exemptions to Japan’s Revised Consumption Tax Law, tr. Vickie L. Beyer,
2000 WTD 247-21 (December 22, 2000). For a translation of the final regulations, Cabinet Order No. 360, 1988
(most recent amendment, Order No. 147, 2000) see: An Order for the Enforcement of the Consumption Tax Law, tr.
Vickie L. Beyer, 2001 WTD 36-24 (February 20, 2001).
12
The Russian tax system is an example of a regime that has partially harmonized its transfer pricing rules, and
roughly follows the OECD model. A single set of transfer pricing rules is applied to all taxes [Arts. 20 & 40, TAX
CODE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, Part 1, Federal Law No. 147-FZ (July 31, 1998) with subsequent amendments
and additions] except for customs and for the VAT imposed on goods crossing the customs border. The exception
that ties the VAT base to the customs value at the border is at Art. 160(1)(1).
Customs valuation is governed by LAW OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION NO. 5003-I ON CUSTOMS TARIFFS
(May 21, 1993) with subsequent amendments and additions. The amended version of this law is effective from 1
July 2006. On customs valuation it is consistent with the GATT Valuation Code, and has been since 1993. Thus, on
transfer pricing matters Russian customs valuation methodology is not vertically harmonized with the rules in the
Russian Federation Tax Code. (Translation assistance of Russian law provided by Alexei Ryabov. Originals and
translations on file with author).
13
EXCISE TAX ACT, R.S.C., ch. E-15, § 215(1)(a) (Can.) (valuation for GST purposes is determined under sections
46 through 55 of the Customs Act, plus all customs duties and additional duties imposed under the Customs Tariff,
countervailing or anti-dumping duties imposed under the Special Import Measures Act, and any other taxes, other
than the GST, imposed under the Excise Tax Act).
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value). Thus, because customs valuation determines GST valuation, the OECD transfer pricing
rules may control customs and GST valuation as well and income tax valuation.14
Some further observations are appropriate. First, the original draft of this memorandum
was issued on March 30, 1989. It expressly referenced the OECD Report, Transfer Pricing and
Multinational Enterprises (1979). When this memorandum was re-issued on April 9, 2001 the
OECD reference was updated, and now cites the Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises and Tax Administrations (1995) as acceptable authority for valuation. Thus, the CRA
is following developments in direct taxation and is sweeping into the mix of acceptable methods
the profit methods that were added by the 1995 Guidelines.
Secondly, the Canadian harmonization is limited. Not only is the harmonization limited
to goods and import transactions, but it is further limited to specific taxpayers as a self-help
measure. Taxpayers may use OECD methods to defend a declared price as a “price paid or
payable,” but the OECD methods are not generally the adopted standard. In other words, the
OECD methods may be used by the taxpayer to prove that a transaction was “not influenced by
the relationship” of the parties. This is not the same thing as saying that the OECD methods are
accepted as the best way to determine customs value. Neither the tax authority nor the taxpayer
can affirmatively rely on OECD methodologies; the taxpayer may defensively use them to
support a declared price when questioned by customs.
The value of the Canadian solution is that it points to a workable solution; one that is
self-help and one that is taxpayer-by-taxpayer based. It is only a border solution, and it is only
applied to goods, but it is workable and has been in place for at least twenty years.
Final Canadian Caveat
A critical final caveat is needed. Although the GVC is concerned with related parties,
and has defined methods to determine prices, customs methods are only applied as a last resort.
Simply having related parties is not sufficient to require their use.15 The circumstances
surrounding the sale must be examined by customs first.16 Pricing methods are only applied after
this examination and only in cases where the examination leads customs to believe that the stated
transaction value appears to have been influenced by the relationship of the parties.17 Even at
this point, customs must have “grounds” for this belief, and the GVC requires that the customs
administration “communicate its grounds” to the importer, and give the importer “a reasonable
opportunity to respond.”18

14

MNR, Memorandum D13-4-5 Transaction value method for related persons ¶¶13-16 (Apr. 9, 2001 & Mar. 30,
1989) (setting out the position of Revenue Canada for customs valuation purposes and indicating that “The CCRA
will accept, for valuation purposes, a price paid or payable which is derived from one of the methods set out in the
OECD report [that is the OECD Report, 1979; later OECD Guidelines, 1995], unless there is information on prices
available which is more directly related to the specific importations.”
15
GVC supra note 1, at Art. 1.2(a) (first sentence).
16
GVC supra note 1, at Art. 1.2(a) (second sentence).
17
GVC supra note 1, at Art. 1.2(a) (third sentence, first clause).
18
GVC supra note 1, at Art. 1.2(a) (third sentence, second clause).

4

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1326454

Richard T. Ainsworth
International Network for Tax Research
12 January 2009

Thus, the GVC structures two points of contact between the importer and the customs
administration before allowing customs to resort to GVC methods to determine value. They are:
• During the period up to and including the circumstances of the sale investigation,
and
• During the period when the importer has a reasonable opportunity to respond to
the “grounds” that customs has set out.
Memorandum D13-4-5 anticipates an OECD-based discussion at the second point – after
customs has received the customs declaration, after it has examined the circumstances of the sale
and after it has formulated “grounds.” It is entirely possible that an importer could make its
OECD-based case to customs well before the importation event – a direct tax advance pricing
agreement (APA), or an advance customs agreement (ACA) for example could be the
evidentiary vehicle. In doing so, the importer would pre-empt a major customs inquiry. The
customs authority would not need to the point of “communicating its grounds,” because the
importer would have convinced the authorities in advance of the appropriateness of the stated
transaction value.
Technically speaking, neither of these approaches (the Memorandum D13-4-5 or the
APA option) actually harmonizes customs and direct tax valuation methodologies. Both of these
approaches use direct tax valuation methods to convince customs (one before and the other after
the import declaration) that customs does not need to resort to using “substitute values.”19
This term “substitute values” suggests the reason that this approach is acceptable to
Canadian customs. It is an important difference between valuation in customs and in direct
taxation – customs valuation methods are deemed to be substitute measures and are designed as
last resorts, whereas direct tax administrations (like the US IRS) believe that transfer pricing
methods are the best way to find “true taxable income”20 between related parties.
RELATIONSHIPS – ASSOCIATED ENTERPRISES
Normally, transfer pricing regimes assess the “closeness” of a buyer and a seller before
proceeding to make adjustments to prices. Only closely “related parties” or “suspect” parties
have transactions that are held up to price-scrutiny. However, when measuring relational
closeness there are as many as five different yardsticks applied globally. These measures differ
depending on the tax and the jurisdiction involved. Some define relationships economically;
others measure it legally; while still others deem a relationship to exist based on whether a
specific good or service is involved. Some systems apply a mix or a multiple of these tests.
There are even instances where no relationship test is applied at all. This later situation results in
either no formal pricing rules (the Commissioner’s discretion determines all), or where pricing
measures are applied to all transactions regardless of the relationship.21
19

GVC supra note 1, at Art. 1.2(c).
Treas. Reg § 1.482-1(i)(9) (emphasis supplied).
21
Although inefficient and cumbersome, diversity on this point is manageable for today’s automated systems.
During the installation and setup of an automated system the tax department of a multinational enterprise will input
their analysis of the relationships among all the entities in a global trading family. When the relationship changes
the system is updated. Automated systems have no difficulty switching back and forth among criteria and taxes to
processes tax results. Parties can be related for VAT or customs, but unrelated for income tax without any
difficulty. During the setup firms might even seek rulings, or offer their analysis as the subject of an APA to make
20
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Vertically harmonizing transfer pricing regimes necessarily means harmonizing these
relationship tests. Without this, adjustments in pricing between “related parties” could be
deemed necessary for VAT/GST purposes whereas adjustments in prices for the same transfers
would not be allowed for direct tax purposes. The reason – because the entities involved would
be deemed related for the purposes of VAT/GST, and not related for income tax purposes.
Relationship/ associated enterprise definitions. This section considers the five major
types of relationship/ associated enterprise definitions applied globally. Some jurisdictions (in
some taxes) draw these rules very specifically, others do not. Some degree of specificity would
seem to be essential here (and this is the case with the GVC), because the relationship/ associated
enterprise test is the gateway to transfer pricing adjustment. No adjustment is appropriate if the
parties are not initially “suspect.”
The OECD does not provide this specificity. It provides nothing more than general
guidance. The OECD’s lack of concern about diversity-in-the-details is a function of its main
objective, which is to get potential treaty partners close enough together so that they are able to
resolve the details at the negotiation table. Determining exactly what constitutes an “associated
enterprise” is a hand-crafted, bilateral outcome of a specific treaty.
Article 9 of the OECD Model Treaty provides a common (general) definition of
“associated enterprises.” It states:
Where
(a) and enterprise of a Contracting State participates directly or indirectly in the
management, control or capital of an enterprise in the other Contracting State, or
(b) the same persons participate directly or indirectly in the management, control or
capital of an enterprise of a Contracting State and an enterprise of the other
Contracting State
The OECD Guidelines provide no more detail, and Klaus Vogel’s analysis of the OECD
Model is consistent with this result. He indicates that providing latitude for flexibility in local
law was expressly intended in the drafting of Article 9:
Whether there is a case of participation in the management, control, or capital of
an enterprise is a matter to be decided by reference to (domestic) company law.
… In paragraph 7 of the OECD Report on Transfer Pricing and Multinational
Enterprises there is an express indication that it was not thought necessary to
define such expressions as “associated enterprises” or “under common control.”
On the contrary it was assumed that there was a broad basis of common
understanding of what was meant. Consequently, it should be left to the law of
the contracting States to determine on the “broad basis of common
understanding” those possibilities of influence being exercised under company
law on which a re-writing of accounts should be based.22
sure the setup conforms to local law. The fact that this complexity can be automated does not make this an optimal
situation. This kind of complexity opens the door to planned arbitrage.
22
KLAUS VOGEL, DOUBLE TAXATION CONVENTIONS, 3rd ed., (1996) 525, ¶23 (it should be noted that the “broad
basis of common understanding” expression does not appear in the later OECD Guidelines, and that reference to a
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Assuming that Klaus Vogel is correct, that there is a “broad basis of common
understanding” of what constitutes “associated enterprises,” and also assuming that an exact
formulation of this understanding in direct taxation flows from the bilateral treaty, then we are
faced with the possibility that when we arrive at this (direct tax) horizontal harmony we are at
the same time disrupting domestic (vertical) harmonies with the other taxes that make transfer
price adjustments in a jurisdiction.
The five basic ways of defining a suspect relationship or associated enterprises are:
(1) Economic relationship. The classic economic-based relationship test is found in the
US income tax, IRC § 482. The statute requires affirmative proof that “… two or more
organizations, trades or businesses [are] … owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the
same interests …”23 The regulations make it clear that the word “controlled” means:
… any kind of control, direct or indirect, whether legally enforceable or not, and
however exercisable or exercised, including control resulting from the action of
two or more taxpayers acting in concert or with a common goal or purpose. It is
the reality of control that is decisive, not its form or the mode of its exercise. A
presumption of control arises if income or deductions have been arbitrarily
shifted.24
US litigation further emphasizes that the requirement is not to prove legal control, but to
prove actual control of the economics of the relationship. The persons or entities involved must
be shown to act together to achieve the common goal of shifting income – distorting the true
economics of the marketplace.25
(2) Legal relationship. The classic application of tests based on legal relationships is
found under the GVC, Article 15(4) and (5). In some of the over 150 countries where these tests
are applied the GVC definitions (because they are part of an international convention) are
directly applicable and binding on the government as a constitutional matter. In other countries

“common understanding” in that document (found at ¶1.14) concern the “common understanding” the business
community and tax administration have with respect to experience applying the arm’s length principle).
23
26 U.S.C. § 482 reads in full:
In any case of two or more organizations, trades, or businesses (whether or not incorporated,
whether or not organized in the United States, and whether or not affiliated) owned or controlled
directly or indirectly by the same interests, the Secretary may distribute, apportion, or allocate
gross income, deductions, credits, or allowances between or among such organizations, trades, or
businesses, if he determines that such distribution, apportionment, or allocation is necessary in
order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of any of such organizations,
trades, or businesses. In the case of any transfer (or license) of intangible property (within the
meaning of section 936(h)(3)(B)), the income with respect to such transfer or license shall be
commensurate with the income attributable to the intangible.
24
Treas. Reg. § 1,482-1(i)(4).
25
Grenada Industries, Inc. v. Commissioner, 17 TC 231, 253-254 (1951), aff’d 372 F2d 415 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
389 US 841 (1953) (involving four families, none of whom held a majority interest in several corporations, but who
acted in concert to direct corporate payments to a partnership for the benefit of two of the families).
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(like the US) it is the intent – not the exact wording – that is followed. This leads to minor
differences in expression, but not in meaning.26 GVC, Article 15(4) and (5) provides:
4. For the purposes of this Agreement, persons shall be deemed to be related only if:
(a) they are officers or directors of one another's businesses;
(b) they are legally recognized partners in business;
(c) they are employer and employee;
(d) any person directly or indirectly owns, controls or holds 5 per cent or more
of the outstanding voting stock or shares of both of them;
(e) one of them directly or indirectly controls the other;
(f) both of them are directly or indirectly controlled by a third person;
(g) together they directly or indirectly control a third person; or
(h) they are members of the same family.
5. Persons who are associated in business with one another in that one is the sole
agent, sole distributor or sole concessionaire, however described, of the other
shall be deemed to be related for the purposes of this Agreement if they fall
within the criteria of paragraph 4.27
Conceptually, this is a dual-principled provision (legal and economic). There appears to
be something very different happening in sections 4(a), (b), (c), (d), (h), and 5 where legal
relationships are specified (interlocking officers and directors; legal partners; employer and
employee relationships; shareholders with a 5 percent interest in voting shares; family members;
sole agents), and sections 4(e), (f) and (g). Each of these latter provisions is built simply around
the term “control” (one party controls the other party either directly or through third parties).
This is strikingly like the economic tests of the US IRC §482 provisions. However, the Notes to
the GVC will not permit such an expansive interpretation. The GVC’s concept of “control” is
not economic – it is legal. The Notes state:
For the purposes of this Agreement, one person shall be deemed to control
another when the former is legally or operationally in a position to exercise
restraint or direction over the latter.28
26

For example, the companion US provisions are found at 19 USC § 1401a(g)(1) and provides:
(g) Special Rules.
(1) For purposes of this section, the persons specified in any of the following subparagraphs
shall be treated as persons who are related:
(A) Members of the same family, including brothers and sisters (whether by whole or half
blood), spouse, ancestors, and lineal descendants.
(B) Any officer or director of an organization and such organization.
(C) An officer or director of an organization and an officer or director of another organization,
if each such individual is also an officer or director in the other organization.
(D) Partners.
(E) Employer and employee.
(F) Any person directly or indirectly owning, controlling, or holding with power to vote, 5
percent or more of the outstanding voting stock or shares of any organization and such
organization.
(G) Two or more persons directly or indirectly controlling, controlled by, or under common
control with, any person.
27
GVC supra note 1, at Art. 15(4) & (5).
28
GVC supra note 1, at Notes to Article 15, paragraph 4(e).
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Thus, GVC Art. 15(4) and (5) is not a set of five legal tests wrapped around three
economic tests. It is a set of eight legal tests. This has not escaped the sharp eye of the
commentators who accept the legal basis of the tests and generally find the language at (e), (f),
and (g) (in the light of the Notes and customs practice) to be “vague,” “sweeping,” “obscure,”
“[im]precise.” As a general matter, these provisions are something that “should have been
deleted” from the GVC altogether.29 Why draft general language that is open to an economic
interpretation, if in fact what is intended are strictly legal tests?
(3) Deemed relationships. Russia has come very close to vertical harmonization of its
transfer pricing rules.30 The exception is customs. Customs transfer pricing is excluded from
Article 40 of the Russian Tax Code, and this is the only thing that makes full harmonization
incomplete (on paper at least). Although internally very consistent, the Russian rules are not
entirely standard when considered from abroad. This creates a horizontal harmonization
problem.
With respect to related parties (in the Russian Code they are called “interdependent
parties”), the Russian Tax Code specifies five categories. Four of the five rely on the legal status
of the parties involved. They are similar to the rules found in the GVC (and one suspects a
conscious borrowing). The fifth category is an unusual three-part deeming provision. This fifth
provision considers parties who are engaged in certain kinds of transactions to be related parties
(regardless of their actual “relatedness”) and subjects their transitions to pricing adjustment. The
five categories are:
(1) One party has a direct or indirect ownership interest in the other party of at
least 20%,
(2) One physical person is subordinate to another physical person in terms of
official status.

29

SAUL L. SHERMAN & HINRICH GLASHOFF, CUSTOMS VALUATION: COMMENTARY ON THE GATT CUSTOMS
VALUATION CODE 188 (1987). In a discussion of Art. 15(4)(e), Sherman and Glashoff reference and apply the
critical language in:
[t]he Note [that] explains that this test is met when one person ‘is legally or operationally in a
position to exercise restraint or direction over’ the other. This [the term ‘control’] is the most
sweeping and least precise of the standards. This provision is as obscure as the employeremployee rule. … The same obscurity applies to the term ‘operationally.’ … The most serious
defect is that this provision uses the concept of control to define the concept of control, and this is
why the meaning is so unclear. The proviso as a whole should have been deleted. (emphasis
added).
Discussing Art. 15(4)(f) and similarly for (g) where they further indicate that the control clauses in these provisions
are:
… set forth a sweeping and vague concept of ‘control’ unrelated to any defined type of
relationship.” (emphasis added).
30
The pricing regime set out in Article 40 of the Russian Tax Code “… does not specify which taxes are covered by
transfer pricing adjustments. [Nevertheless,] it is generally accepted that taxes other than profits tax are potentially
covered by the new rules.” Peter Arnett, Russia, TRANSFER PRICING INT’L: COUNTRY BY COUNTRY GUIDE at
29.9(h), 29.3 & 29.4 (Oct. 9, 2003) LexisNexis. Victor Matchekhin, Russia: Transfer Pricing Rules, Practice and
Potential Development, INT’L TRANSFER PRICING J (May/June 2003) 124, 125 agrees with this assessment and
references the use of these rules in two VAT cases (North-West District Court, decision A56-34965/01 of Sept. 20,
2002; North-West District Court, decision A56-21019/01 of Dec. 19, 2001).
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(3) The persons concerned are married to one another, or related to one another by
blood, or by marriage, or are connected by adoption.
(4) One person is the guardian of another.
(5) The parties are deemed to be interdependent if:
(a) The transaction is by barter, and goods or services are exchanged.
(b) The transaction is a foreign trade transaction. The term “foreign trade
transaction” is not otherwise defined, but the term “foreign trade activity”
is defined in the Tax Code to mean entrepreneurial activity in the area of
international exchange of goods, work, services, information, and results
of intellectual activity, including exclusive rights thereto, including
intellectual property.
(c) The transactions take place where the level of prices used for identical
or similar goods fluctuates by more than 20% in either direction over a
short period of time. The term “short period of time” is not otherwise
defined.31
Thus, Russian definitions of “interdependent parties” lack horizontal harmony with
companion definitions of “associated enterprises” or “related parties” in other jurisdictions. As a
result, it is common for treaty negotiations to pull these Russian rules into horizontal harmony
with those used by trading partners. This then pulls these definitions out of domestic (vertical)
harmony. One of the reasons for the unique flavor to the Russian rules most likely has to do with
the Russian Federation’s status with international organizations: it is a “candidate country” of the
OECD,32 and an observer at the WTO.33 It appears that the pull of internal (vertical) harmonies
is somewhat stronger than the pull of external (horizontal) harmonies in Russia.
Assume for example that the deeming provisions are applied. A Russian entity and an
entity of an OECD country engage in (a) an “international exchange” that involves (b) “goods,
work, services, information, and results of intellectual activity.” In this case, transactions
between these parties would not be “suspect” under OECD rules – they are not associated
enterprises. However, they could nevertheless be subjected to Russian transfer pricing
adjustments – they are interdependent parties under Russian rules. If a Russian adjustment is
made, it is very possible that the OECD country would refuse to make corresponding
adjustments. When a problem like this causes significant business problems, tax treaty
negotiations may not be far away.

31

Arnett, supra note 30.
Adjustments in some of these rules might be expected as Russia has recently been invited to join the OECD.
OECD, COUNCIL RESOLUTION ON ENLARGEMENT AND ENHANCED ENGAGEMENT (adopted by the OECD Council at
Ministerial level on 16 May 2007) at ii, extract reported in OECD, CENTER FOR CO-OPERATION WITH NONMEMBERS, THE OECD’S GLOBAL RELATIONS PROGRAMME 2007-1008, CCNM(2007)2 (May 22, 2007) at 14,
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/46/25/38668215.pdf.
The Council … (ii) Decides to open discussions with Chile, Estonia, Israel, the Russian Federation
and Slovenia and invites the Secretary-General to set out the terms, conditions and process for the
accession of each of these countries to the OECD for subsequent consideration and adoption by
Council.
33
The observer status of the Russian Federation is noted on the WTO web page available at:
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm.
32
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(4) No relationship rules other than customs. Some countries pay no attention to the
relationship of the parties (other than in customs) because there are no transfer pricing rules in
income tax. The transfer pricing (and related party) rules in the customs area are used because
(as a member of the WTO) the jurisdiction is required to adopt the GVC.
There are a large number of countries in this category. Without conducting a
comprehensive survey, it appears that 137 countries could be in this group – if we take the 150
countries in the WTO34 and reduce it by the 33 countries that are commonly identified as
countries with significant income tax transfer pricing regimes. The only transfer pricing rules
these countries apply are those prescribed by the GVC. These jurisdictions also tend to follow
subjectively valuation principles in VAT,35 and the relationship between the parties is never a
factor.
(5) Relatedness ignored in transfer pricing application. Some jurisdictions have
exceptionally robust transfer pricing rules in income tax and VAT, so robust in fact that they are
applied even without proof of a suspect relationship. There is no need to even deem the parties
to be related.36 Prices are always held up to an arm’s length standard. Essentially these
jurisdictions use transfer pricing to enforce tax avoidance or tax evasion rules.
Australia provides the classic example. Australia reaches the same results (but not in the
same way) as the Russian Federation does on this issue. The central concern is with
34

Id. (listing the 150 member countries of the WTO).
Subjective and objective approaches to valuation are another major way to divide VAT/GST regimes. The
difference is best explained with an example:
Consider a restaurant meal. If it is sold to the public for 50, costs 25 to prepare, but is supplied to
employees for 10, what is the VAT base? Under subjective valuation, VAT is imposed on 10, because under this
theory VAT is imposed on the consideration. This is the amount consumer actually paid, and the amount most
readily available to the vendor to inscribed on the invoice. If goods or services are exchanged “in kind” or in
addition to money, it is necessary to value this consideration in monetary terms. There may be a small amount of
transfer price valuation for these transactions. Objective valuation is different. Under this theory tax would be
imposed on the 50. Objective valuation VAT regimes measure the value of the supply, regardless of the amount of
consideration actually paid. There will be considerably more transfer pricing valuation exercises under this system.
VAT jurisdictions can be placed along a continuum when the relative use of objective verses subjective
valuation measures is isolated as a distinguishing criteria. Four types of jurisdictions are possible, but only three
appear to be in common use. At one extreme there are jurisdictions that apply only subjective valuation
methodologies (encompassing both arm’s length and related party transactions). This is the case in Albania. [LAW
ON VALUE-ADDED TAX , No. 7928, 1995 (Albania) at Art. 27] A second group of jurisdictions employ subjective
valuations for the most part [1991 SA REVENUE 89; REVENUE, VALUE-ADDED TAX ACT No. 89 of 1991 at § 10(23)
(South Africa)], but adopt objective measures of value when considering a small subset (some, but not all) of the
related party transactions. This is the case in Canada. [EXCISE TAX ACT, R.S.C., ch. E-15, § 154(1) (Can.)] A third
group of jurisdictions always shift to an objective measure of the tax base whenever the parties are related. Related
party transactions are viewed as inherently suspect. Transactions among unrelated parties are trustworthy, and are
valued subjectively. This is the case in Barbados. [VALUE ADDED TAX ACT, 1996 at § 18(1) (Barbados)]. A fourth
approach to valuation is possible – valuing all transactions objectively. No jurisdiction has adopted it.
Importantly, among these four positions, there is no “majority position.”
36
Although the end result in most cases is no different than that under the “deemed relationship” rules of the
Russian Federation, there is a slight difference. Because the Russian rule is based on an assumption that bartering,
international and high price volatility transactions only take place between related parties, there is a slight opening
through which to argue (in a specific case) that the parties involved are truly not related. However, if a jurisdiction
decides to ignore the relationship element entirely this window is closed.
35
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international transactions. The Explanatory Memorandum to the (Australian) Income Tax
Amendment Bill of 1982 expresses this concern and clearly indicates that Australia intends to
target unrelated parties with an expansion of transfer pricing rules:
There can be cases where formally unrelated parties to an agreement do not deal
with one another on an arm’s length basis, viewed simply in relation to a
particular supply or acquisition of property. This could be the case where the
particular transaction which reduces a taxpayer’s Australian income is offset by
benefits under another seemingly unrelated agreement, which may accrue abroad
and perhaps to an associate of the taxpayer.
This statutory provision gives the Commissioner sweeping powers. Essentially whenever
he determines that property is supplied at less than arm’s length, the Commissioner can adjust
the price.
Where –
(a) a taxpayer has supplied property under an international agreement;
(b) the Commissioner, having regard to any connection between any two or more
of the parties to the agreement or to any other relevant circumstances, is satisfied
that the parties to the agreement, or any two or more of those parties, were not
dealing at arm’s length with each other in relation to the supply;
(c) consideration was received or receivable by the taxpayer in respect of the
supply but the amount of that consideration was less than the arm’s length
consideration in respect of the supply; and
(d) the Commissioner determines that this subsection should apply in relation to
the taxpayer in relation to the supply,
then, for all purposes of the application of this Act in relation to the taxpayer,
consideration equal to the arm’s length consideration in respect of the supply shall be
deemed to be the consideration received or receivable by the taxpayer in respect of the
supply.37
This provision is transaction-focused. It indicates that “any connection” or “any other
relevant circumstance” is sufficient to allow a transfer pricing adjustment to be made. As was
the case with the Russian provisions, it is very possible that after an Australian adjustment is
made involving unrelated parties, compensating adjustments by the other jurisdiction could be
denied – simply based on the fact that the parties were unrelated. This is a somewhat surprising
outcome for an OECD member country that joined the organization in 1971. If the OECD has
indeed brought about an international taxation regime one might expect this result in the case of
the non-OECD member, Russia, but not in the case of Australia.38
If the definition of related parties/associated enterprises is the first filter, the screen
through which all transfer pricing cases must pass before pricing adjustments are determined, it
will be problematical if the pricing of same transaction, between the same parties is both suspect
and not suspect at the same time. One would hope for some consistence (vertical harmony) in
37

INCOME TAX ASSESSMENT ACT, 1936, § 136AD(1) (Australia) (emphasis supplied).
The Australian provisions under ITAA 1936 § 136AD are not vertically harmonized. They apply only to the
income tax. The “deemed relationship” provisions under Article 40 of the Russian Tax Code however are vertically
integrated, and apply broadly to all taxes except in customs administration.

38
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these rules. This appears to be what the Russian Federation has attempted to achieve, but this
very success is leading to pressures to undo this harmony through treaty negotiation (horizontal
harmonization).
Conclusion: Relationship/ associated enterprise definitions. Is there a better way
forward? Could the Canadian solution – one that is self-help and taxpayer-by-taxpayer based be
applied? Could the Canadian “border solution,” to accept a determination in one tax to be an
appropriate determination of value in another tax be extended? Specifically, would it be possible
to deem parties to be related for customs and VAT/GST purposes in all instances where they are
related for direct tax purposes? If so, how would this rule work? Which determination would be
dominant? Could this rule be universal? Would the rule be elective and effective only after
agreement with the tax administration?
METHODS
All tax regimes have an interest in determining the correct price on “suspect” related
party transactions when the prices reported appear to impact the tax base. The degree of concern
is not the same among all taxes. Income tax regimes are far and away the most concerned,39
customs next40 and VAT a distant third. 41
39

The income tax concern follows directly from the size of the cross-border related person trade. 60% of all crossborder trade is conducted by multinational entities, with roughly 40% of cross-border trade conducted within those
entities. As a result, transfer pricing issues dominate international tax investigations. See generally the issue
October 10, 1994 issue of Tax Notes International that focused on foreign government reactions to the new US
transfer pricing regulations. 94 TAX NOTES INT’L 196-16 (Oct. 10, 1994) (indicating throughout that the US
employs more international examination agents than any of our trading partners, and that about half of pending US
tax cases involved transfer pricing issues).
40
SHERMAN & GLASHOFF supra note29, at 199, n.140 (and related text). Referencing a 1982 GATT survey
indicating that the transaction value had been the prevailing method applied, and concluding: “With Transaction
Value so widely applied, it necessarily follows that most related-party transfer prices are being accepted, since such
transactions are variously estimated to be in the range of 50 percent or more of total trade – something like 70
percent of US-Canada trade is informally estimated to fall in the related party categories.” The GATT survey
indicated that 95.4% of EC trade, 96.6% of Japanese trade 94.0% of US trade was processed with the transaction
value, suggesting that the developed economies are not encountering significant transfer pricing problems in
customs enforcement.
41
In the EU VAT the open market re-valuation of supplies is only available in a small subset of all connected party
transactions, and even in those cases it only applies to combat VAT avoidance or evasion. Only transactions where
one of the parties is an exempt or partially exempt taxpayer are included within the rules. The proposal states
(COM(2005) 89 final at 5):
The Article therefore only allows re-valuation in the context of combating tax avoidance or
evasion and in order to do so, a series of additional tests also need to be satisfied. The rule can be
applied only when parties are connected … [and] only allowed in circumstances: (in the case of an
undervaluation) where VAT has been charged and the recipient of the supply is not entitled to a
full right of deduction of VAT; or (in the case of an overvaluation) VAT has been charged and the
supplier is not entitled to a full right of deduction of VAT. Where VAT has not been charged, the
revaluation is only applicable where an exempt supply has been undervalued by a partly exempt
person.
In other word, the qualification in the opening sentence of this section that, “All the tax regimes considered in this
study have an interest in determining that the correct price … when those transactions impact their respective tax
bases,” applies directly to the VAT. As long as both parties to a transaction are fully taxable, the transfer price
among related parties is not a concern, because ultimately VAT is collected from final consumption (not)
intermediate transactions.
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It is not surprising therefore that the most sophisticated transfer pricing methods are
found in the thirty-three jurisdictions42 that have serious income tax transfer pricing regimes
(serious in the sense that they have well developed documentation and reporting requirements
along with detailed standards set out in the law, not simply transfer pricing provisions that “could
be” applied when the occasion arises). These jurisdictions are (by and large) the more developed
economies. When there is vertical harmonization of methods in these countries it is income tax
and VAT/GST harmonization – customs resists conformity.
The vast majority of jurisdictions (91%)43 are different. In these jurisdictions there are no
well-developed (or any) income tax transfer pricing rules. Transfer pricing theory in these
jurisdictions is primarily a function of customs enforcement. When there is vertical
harmonization of methods in these countries it is between customs and VAT/GST – income tax
ignores the issue.
Thus, there is (limited) vertical harmonization of transfer pricing methods. It is a binary
harmonization for the most part. It is either (a) income tax and VAT/GST harmonization, or (b)
customs and VAT/GST harmonization. Other harmonies are rare.
It is exceptionally rare to find tripartite harmonization of methods – the use of a single
method among income tax, VAT/GST and customs. However, there are some jurisdictions where
the VAT/GST methods are drafted so vaguely that in a given instance the VAT/GST method
employed could be found to be the same as that applied in either the income tax or a customs
application.
An additional corollary is that frequently there is not just one harmonization per
jurisdiction. It is reasonably common to find VAT/GST methods aligning with customs methods
at the border, and then have other VAT/GST applications aligning with income tax methods
away from the border.
The great problem then is the difficulty that domestic systems have in harmonizing
income tax and customs rules. This is what makes the Canadian memorandum D13-4-5 most
striking. Memorandum D13-4-5 is an effort to directly harmonize income tax and customs
methods.
Five basic methodologies. There are five basic transfer pricing methodologies.
Considering each method one-by-one it soon becomes apparent that some methods can have
across the board appeal, whereas others are more suited to one tax or the other but will rarely be
harmonized across all three.
There is a range of receptivity to these methods. For example, the US income tax finds
all five approaches acceptable (depending on the facts and circumstances of the case).44 The US
42

See supra note 3 and accompanying text for commentary and a list of countries.
See supra notes 34 & 3 and calculating 91% = 137/150.
44
Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(c)(1) (indicating that the arm’s length result of a controlled transaction must be determined
under the method “… that, under the facts and circumstances, provides the most reliable measure of an arm’s length
result.” ).
43
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tries to find the “best” among all the method. In contrast, the VAT/GST in smaller or developing
countries like Barbados, Fiji and Jamaica has a very basic design. These jurisdictions apply a
single method (a one-size-fits-all approach) that is frequently borrowed from customs
(commonly a TVI/ TVS aggregate).45
The section that follows examines the first three of the five major transfer pricing
methods (the three traditional methods). The two profit-based methods are considered
elsewhere,46 and their usefulness in VAT/GST application is limited.
For the three traditional methods variances in their structure and application are identified
(among income tax, customs and VAT/GST regimes). More emphasis is placed on VAT/GST
than on income tax or customs, because (as a global matter) it is the VAT/GST that is reaching
out (frequently in both directions) to forge harmonious methodologies. The effort will be to
show where harmonies have been established, and where they have not.
(1) Comparable uncontrolled price (CUP) &Transaction value of Identical/
Transaction value of similar goods (TVI/ TVS) methods. The comparable uncontrolled price
method (CUP) is the preferred transfer pricing method of the US regulations,47 as well as of the
OECD Guidelines.48 It is very similar to the combined effect of the first two substitute methods
under the GVC – the transaction value of identical goods method (TVI), and the transaction
value of similar goods method (TVS).49 Rules that function similar to the CUP or TVI/ TVS
methodologies can be found under most VAT regimes.

45

VALUE ADDED TAX ACT, 1996 at § 20 (Barbados) (simply indicating that the method is to determine the amount
that the supply, “… would reasonably be expected to fetch on a supply in the open market to a recipient who is not
connected to the supplier.”). 1991 REPUBLIC OF FIJI 45; VALUE ADDED TAX DECREE No. 45 of 1991 at §§ 19(3) &
2(1) (simply indicating that the method is to determine “… the consideration in money that would be expected to be
payable for that supply, being a supply at that date in Fiji, between a supplier and a recipient independent of each
other.”). It can of course be argued that these VAT regimes propose no method at all, and the referenced language
only re-states the arm’s length standard, in which case it becomes a matter of satisfying the tax authority that the
correct result has been reached. This is the case in Jamaica. THE GENERAL CONSUMPTION TAX ACT, 1991 at § 2(1)
(Jamaica) (indicating that the method is the demonstration that “satisfies the Commissioner,” or “… the amount of
consideration in money (excluding tax) which the Commissioner is satisfied would be payable in respect of a taxable
supply by a person who is not a connected person in an arm’s length transaction.” Without regulations explaining
how the Jamaican Commissioner is to be satisfied this is a standard that is searching for the “best method,” and is
most likely receptive to any of the methods specified under the domestic income tax or customs regime.
46
Richard T. Ainsworth, IT-APAs: Harmonizing Inconsistent Transfer Pricing Rules in Income Tax-Customs-VAT,
34 RUTGERS COMP. & TECH. L.J. 1 (2007).
47
CYM H. LOWELL, MARIANNE BURGE & PETER L. BRIGER, U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER PRICING ¶4.05[1] &
[2](2ND ed.), on line at West Law WGL-ITP (indicating that “[t]he status of the CUP method as the highest priority
means of satisfying the arm’s length requirement in the case of tangible goods transactions remains unquestioned.
This priority has, however, undergone a very careful reexamination … The 1992 Proposed Regulations would have
severely restricted the scope of application of the CUP method, by requiring that an uncontrolled transaction involve
the identical property and by not permitting the use of inexact comparables. … The 1994 Regulations, which
affirmed the arm’s length principle and set forth a best method rule to provide more flexibility in measuring arm’s
length requirements, has the effect of retaining the CUP method as the best method where its requirements can be
satisfied.”).
48
OECD, GUIDELINES supra note 2, at ¶ 2.6 (stating, “where it is possible to locate comparable uncontrolled
transactions, the CUP Method is the most direct and reliable …”)
49
GVC supra note 1, at Art. 2 & 3.
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Income tax (CUP). Under the CUP method the arm’s length price of a related party
transaction is considered to be equal to the price paid in a comparable uncontrolled sale.
Assuming a comparable transaction can be found, the only significant issue under the CUP
method is what should be done if there are differences between the controlled party transaction
and those between the uncontrolled parties. Both US regulations50 and OECD Guidelines51
anticipate that minor adjustments can be made.
Customs (TVI/ TVS). The GVC takes a similar approach, but splits the CUP concept
between two Articles. The transaction value of identical goods (TVI) is considered in Article 2,
and the transaction value of similar goods (TVS) is considered in Article 3. They must be
applied in sequence. Identical goods are:
... the same in all respects, including physical characteristics, quality and
reputation. Minor differences in appearance would not preclude goods otherwise
conforming to the definition from being regarded as identical.52
Similar goods are:
… goods which, although not alike in all respects, have like characteristics and
like component materials which enable them to perform the same functions and to
be commercially interchangeable. The quality of the goods, their reputation and
the existence of a trademark are among the factors to be considered in
determining whether goods are similar.53
As under the CUP method, adjustments can be made to TVI and TVS values when
precisely comparable transactions cannot be identified. However, the adjustments permitted
under customs rules are significantly more limited than those allowed under the income tax.
Custom adjustments are only for “differences attributable to commercial level and/or to
quantity.”54
50

Treas. Reg. § 1.482-3(b)(2)(B) list the following factors that can be adjusted, if they would affect the price:
(1) Quality of the product;
(2) Contract terms (e.g., scope and terms of warranties provided, sales or purchase volume, credit terms,
transport terms);
(3) Level of the market (i.e., wholesale, retail, etc.);
(4) Geographic market in which the transition takes place;
(5) Date of the transaction;
(6) Intangible property associated with the sale;
(7) Foreign currency risks; and
(8) Alternatives realistically available to the buyer and the seller.
51
OECD, GUIDELINES supra note 2, at ¶ 2.7 (indicating that, “… an uncontrolled transaction is comparable to a
controlled transaction [i.e., it is a comparable uncontrolled transaction] for purposes of the CUP method if one of
two conditions is met: (1) none of the differences [if any] between the transactions being compared or between the
enterprises undertaking those transactions could materially affect the price on the open market; or (2) reasonable
accurate adjustments can be made to eliminate the material effects of such differences.).
52
GVC supra note 1, at Art. 15(2)(a).
53
GVC supra note 1, at Art. 15(2)(b). Compare with the list of adjustments under the income tax supra note 50.
54
GVC supra note 1, at Art. 2(1)(b) & 3(1)(b) are identical except for the word “identical” used in Art. 2(1)(b) and
the word “similar” in Art. 3(1)(b). They read as follows:
In applying this Article, the transaction value of identical [similar] goods in a sale at the same
commercial level and in substantially the same quantity as the goods being valued shall be used to
determine the customs value. Where no such sale is found, the transaction value of identical
[similar] goods sold at a different commercial level and/or in different quantities shall be used,
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There are two additional differences between the income tax approach to a CUP and the
GVC approach to TVI and TVS. First, under the GVC in order for the transaction being valued
to be considered identical or similar to the transaction between related parties, the goods must
have been produced in the same country.55 There is no similar requirement under either the
OECD or the US rules.
Secondly, the GVC has a distinct preference for internal comparables – goods produced
by the same seller. It indicates that:
Goods produced by a different person shall be taken into account only where
there are no identical or similar goods, as the case may be, produced by the same
person as the goods being valued.56
A related requirement also applies. Goods produced by the same person are valued only if they
are: (a) actually imported, and they are either (b) actually valued under Article 1, or they provide
(c) an acceptable basis for valuation under Articles 2 or 3.57 There are no similar requirements
under either US or OECD rules.
These customs rules can produce anomalous (economically inaccurate) results. For
example, suppose Nigerian crude oil is imported into the same country, in the same volumes, on
the same day, and under the same market conditions as is absolutely identical Venezuelan crude
oil. Under OECD and US rules the price of the Venezuelan crude (subject to adjustments for
differences in transportations costs) is a CUP for the Nigerian crude. Under the GVC the
Venezuelan crude would be neither a TVI nor a TVS for the Nigerian crude. Adjusting for the
difference in the origin of the goods is not possible under the GVC. In fact, similar (but not
identical) crude produced by the same party (in Nigeria) would set the customs value, if the
transaction value under Article 1 is rejected or cannot be applied.
Vertical Harmonization – Income Tax CUP & Customs TVI/ TVS. It is difficult to see
how CUP and TVI/ TVS can be harmonized without making significant changes to one method
or the other. This study has not found any examples where this has occurred. The CUP method
searches broadly for comparable transactions and is willing to liberally adjust the data to align
transactions. In contrast, the TVI/ TVS methods are narrow and rigid. They adjust only for
commercial level and quantity, limit the comparable transactions to the same country of origin,
and prefer internal comparables. Although it is possible that the same result can be reached
under both systems, harmony is not assured.
VAT/GST. Most VAT/GST regimes adopt some form of a CUP or TVI/TVS valuation
methodology. There are three general types of harmonized CUP or TVI/TVS valuation systems.
They can be set along a sliding scale from:
• fully harmonized with CUP – VAT/GST rules are directly linked to income tax rules;
adjusted to take account of differences attributable to commercial level and/or to quantity,
provided that such adjustments can be made on the basis of demonstrable evidence which clearly
establishes the reasonableness and accuracy of the adjustment, whether the adjustment leads to an
increase or a decrease in the value.
55
GVC supra note 1, at Art. 15(2)(d).
56
GVC supra note 1, at Art. 15(2)(e).
57
SHERMAN & GLASHOFF supra note 29, at 203, ¶ 634.
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•

parallel harmonization with CUP or TVI/ TVS – VAT/GST rules are independent, but
ambiguously paraphrase companion provisions that can harmonize in either direction;
roughly harmonized with CUP or TVI/TVS – VAT/GST rules contain very sparse
methodology statements, but what is set down is patterned on either CUP or TVI/TVS
methodologies; and
not harmonized at all – these jurisdictions have neither CUP-like nor TVI/ TVS-like
valuation rules.

Fully harmonized CUP – Japan, Spain, Russia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and
Georgia, with further consideration of Uzbekistan, Chile and Ecuador. All of these
jurisdictions (except Uzbekistan, Chile and Ecuador at the moment) apply exactly the same CUP
method in income tax and VAT.58 There are two ways this is accomplished, one is to put the
CUP method in the income tax and then directly link the VAT to it; the other is to place the CUP
method in a separate statute, and then indirectly link the income tax and VAT by linking both to
this third statute. Spain and Japan take the first approach; Russia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and
Georgia take the second.
Transfer pricing under the Japanese Consumption Tax, a credit subtraction VAT without
invoices,59 is handled by proxy. The Consumption Tax law specifically ties all Consumption
Tax valuation issues to methods employed under the corporate income tax (except for valuation
issues at the border which follow customs transfer pricing rules).60 The Japanese corporate
income tax follows the OECD Guideline, and the CUP method is given priority. Thus, exactly
the same methods and priority apply in the Consumption Tax.61
A similarly harmonized transfer pricing methodology has been enacted in Spain. Spain,
like Japan, places all transfer pricing methods into the Spanish Corporate Income Tax. Methods
under the VAT are directly linked to the corporate income tax (except for valuation at the border

58

It would be possible for a jurisdiction to apply exactly the same method in customs and VAT, but no examples of
this approach to harmonization have been fond.
59
ALAN Schenk & OLIVER Oldman, VALUE ADDED TAX: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
38 Transnational Publishers 2001 (discussing the various types of VAT globally, distinguishing the annualized
Japanese VAT from the invoice-based VAT common in most other countres).
60
JAPAN’S REVISED CONSUMPTION TAX LAW (SHOUHIZEIHOU), Art. 28(2) LAW NO. 108, 1988, AND
APPENDIXES by approving the changes contained in LAW NO. 49, 2000; CABINET ORDER (SHOUHIZEIHOU
SEKOUREI) NO. 360, 1988 (most recent amendment, ORDER NO. 147, 2000 available at: http://law.egov.go.jp/cgi-bin/idxsearch.cgi. (in Japanese). For an English translation of the Consumption Tax law based on
Law No. 108, 1988 by approving changes contained in Law No. 49, 2000 see: Consumption Tax Law, tr. Vickie L.
Beyer, 2000 WTD 247-20 (December 22, 2000). For a translation of the appendixes to Japan’s revised consumption
tax law, Law No. 108 see: Translation of Exemptions to Japan’s Revised Consumption Tax Law, tr. Vickie L. Beyer,
2000 WTD 247-21 (December 22, 2000). For a translation of the final regulations, Cabinet Order No. 360, 1988
(most recent amendment, Order No. 147, 2000) see: An Order for the Enforcement of the Consumption Tax Law, tr.
Vickie L. Beyer, 2001 WTD 36-24 (February 20, 2001).
61
The Japanese transfer pricing legislation is codified in the Special Taxation Measures Law (Sozei-tokubetsusochihou) (STML) Article 66-4. The legislation is supplemented by the SMTL Enforcement Order Article (Sozeitokubetsu-sochihou-sekourei) 39-12 and the SMTL Ministerial Order Article 22-11. The National Tax
Administration's interpretation of the transfer pricing laws and regulations is set out in the SMTL Basic Circular.
Japan follows the OECD Guidelines. The CUP method is specified at SMTL Article 66-4(2).
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where customs transfer pricing rules are followed).62 Spain adopts the OECD Guidelines and
makes the CUP a first priority method.63
The Tax Code of the Russian Federation accomplishes the same result as do the Japanese
and Spanish laws, but it does so indirectly. The Russian approach is a classic example of full
harmonization by indirect linkage. Part 1 of the Code sets out basic rules applicable to all taxes
(excluding customs). Articles 20 and 40 of Part 1 concern transfer pricing.64 The CUP method
is the principal method.65 Part 2 of the Russian Code contains a large number of tax laws,
including the income tax and the VAT. Because each of the taxes in Part 2 relies on the
harmonized definitions in Part 1, the same transfer pricing methods (with the same priority given
to the CUP) are applied to the Russian VAT and the Russian income tax.66
62

Spain follows EU rules under the SIXTH DIRECTIVE, supra note 7, at Art. 11(A)(1)(a); RVD Art. 73.
Spanish Act 36/2006 of Nov. 29, 2006 amends the VALUE ADDED TAX ACT 37/1992 (Dec. 28, 1992) Art. 79.5
(providing, “For purposes of the previous two paragraphs [concerning the definition of the open market value], Art.
16 CTA [Corporate Tax Act] will be applicable, when appropriate.”) Royal Legislative decree 4/2004 (the Spanish
Corporate Tax Act) was also modified by Act 36/2006 (Nov. 29, 2006) to amend the methodologies for Spanish
transfer pricing to specifically adopt the five OECD methods.
64
Peter Arnett, supra note 30, at ¶29.1 (indicating that Prior to the enactment of Part 1 of the Russian Tax Code in
1999 no transfer pricing rules applied in any taxes, and that there were only special rules dealing with sales below
cost in the Russian VAT).
65
The Russian Code has a hierarchy of methods, with proof of the impossibility of using the CUP method as a
precondition of moving into other methods.
The market price of a particular good or service under the CUP method is defined as the market
price of identical (or homogeneous) goods, work, or services under comparable economic or
commercial conditions (Article 40.4) Economic conditions are considered to be comparable if the
difference between such conditions does not materially affect the price. Market price is
determined on the basis transactions between unrelated parties.
Article 40 of the Tax Code specifies various conditions as reasonable justification for a
difference between the price of a transaction and a market price. The CUP can be established by
making adjustments to a known benchmark market price where it is possible to quantify the effect
of different economic conditions.
Id. at ¶29.4(a).
66
The Russian system of harmonization is not unique. A similar tax code can be found in Georgia. A general
definition of related persons (special persons) applies to income tax, VAT (and a series of other taxes except
customs) at TAX CODE OF GEORGIA, 1997 (as amended) Pt. I, Ch. 1, Art. 24(2):
(a) persons are founders (participants) of the same enterprise, if their share is not less than 20 percent;
(b) one person has a direct or indirect interest in another person, which is an enterprise, where such an interest
is not less than 20 percent;
(c) one person is subordinate to the other person in terms of his business, position or one person is under
control (directly or indirectly) of the other person;
(d) persons are subsidiary enterprises or are under direct or indirect control of a third person;
(e) persons jointly (directly or indirectly) control third persons;
(f) persons are relatives.
This definition is followed with a uniform set of methods to be used to determine the “market price” for “goods,
works or services” when these transactions are between related persons. TAX CODE OF GEORGIA, 1997 (as
amended) Pt. I, Ch. 1, Art. 27. Article 27 follows a customs approach to valuation, following a TVI/TVS model
rather than an income tax or CUP format. It has clear ordering rules (identical over similar), but with a further
preference for transactions close in time to the suspect transaction (even to the extent of inverting the preference for
identical over similar when the time of the transaction becomes a factor). It specifies that identical transactions by
unrelated parties are considered first, and then similar transactions by unrelated parties [Art. 27(1)]. These
transactions must occur close in time to the suspect transaction [Art. 27(2)]. If it is not possible to find acceptable
comparables, then other (less proximate) identical (and then similar) transactions by unrelated parties are
63
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A number of Former Soviet Republics follow the example of the two-part Russian tax
code. Azerbaijan,67 Turkmenistan,68 and Georgia69 follow the Russian example. Each country
places transfer pricing rules in an opening part and associates a number of taxes (including the
income tax and the VAT) with these rules in the second part. Although neither Russia nor any
of the Former Soviet Republics fully adopt the OECD Guidelines (neither profit-split nor
transactional net margin methods are included in any of these codes) each code adopts the CUP
method and gives it priority over all other methods.
There are exceptions within the Russian sphere of influence. Uzbekistan,70 for example,
follows the Russian model of a two-part tax code but has no related party or transfer pricing
methods included in the first part.
However, a two-part tax code design is not limited to Russia and the Former Soviet
Republics. Chile and Ecuador have similar two-part codes, and currently reach non-harmonized
results in the application of the transfer pricing rules they have in place. The outcome is
different because both Chile and Ecuador actually implement their transfer pricing methods, but
do so only in the income tax. Ecuador’s two-part tax code includes both related party rules and
transfer pricing methods, and the methods follow the OECD Guidelines.71
considered, but only if they occur within 30 days of the suspect transaction [Art. 27(5)]. This provision is followed
by authority to issue regulations that will further specify methods to be used at Art 27(6):
If the provisions of parts 1-5 of this Article cannot be applied, the market price of goods (works,
services) is determined according to the procedure prescribed by the Ministry of Economy in
coordination with the Ministry of Finance. At the same time, account shall be taken of costs for
the production and (or) sale (acquisition price or depreciated value) of the goods (woks, services)
that are customary in such instances, and costs for transportation, storage, insurance and other
similar costs that are customary in such instances, as well as additional charges or discounts that
are customary for transactions between non-interdependent persons, considering factors of supply
and demand on the market of goods (works, services). The aforementioned discounts are taken
into account, in particular, in the case of quality deterioration or loss of other consumer qualities of
the goods, or expiration (approaching expiration date) of the service life period or sale period of
the goods.
The clear impression under the Georgia statute is that the same TVI/TVS or CUP type of analysis will solve most of
the transfer pricing problems in income tax and VAT.
67
TAX CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN, Law No. 905-IG at Arts. 14.6.3, (Jul. 11, 2000) (Azerbaijan)
(indicating that comparable goods, services or works that are “identical and similar” have a first priority).
68
TAX CODE OF TURKMENISTAN, 2005 at Pt. 1, Sec. IV, Ch. 2, Art. 36(3) (Turkmenistan) (indicating that
comparables that are based on identical or similar goods, services or works have a first priority).
69
TAX CODE OF GEORGIA, 1997 (as amended) Pt. I, Ch. 1, Art. 27(6) (setting out methods to determine the “market
price” with a first priority given to identical and similar supplies).
70
TAX CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF UZBEKISTAN, Art. 18, Law No. 396-I (April 24, 1997) (although designed in a
similar manner the Uzbekistan code does not contain a general provision in Part 1 dealing with related parties or
with transfer pricing methods, however in the income tax alone the above provision allows the Commissioner to
adjust taxable income of “correlated parties,” but again without specified methods).
71
The general rule authorizing transfer pricing adjustments in Chile is contained in Article 64 of the Tax Code. It is
drafted broadly to cover all taxes:
When the price or value assigned to tangible or intangible goods or services is the taxable base or
one of the elements needed to determine a tax, the Administration, without any previous notice,
could set their price or value when it is notoriously lesser than those used in the market or those
which are normally charged in similar contracts, considering the circumstances of the transaction.
Tax Code, No. 830 (Dec. 1974), as amended Law No. 20,125 (Oct. 18, 2006) at Art. 64 (Chile). However
this authority is affirmatively implemented only in income tax where CUP, RSP and C+ methods are
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In the Ecuadorian case, a current tax reform is changing things. The new Ecuador law
vertically harmonizes transfer pricing methods following the 1995 OECD Guidelines in income
tax and VAT. Ecuador follows the Spanish result through indirect (rather than direct) linkage.72
Parallel harmonized CUP or TVI/ TVS – Australia & New Zealand. The Australian
and New Zealand GST do not directly (or indirectly) link GST methodologies to income tax or
customs rules. Three parallel systems are intended (income tax, customs and GST). However, it
is not clear in either case (Australian or New Zealand) if the intent is to parallel the income tax,
the customs rules, or both. This ambiguity stems from the drafting of the GST rules. Because
the GST rules are set out in general terms, with an emphasis particularly in the Australian case
on examples, not technical descriptions, the GST rules appear to reach out in both directions.
The tax policy guiding the Australian and New Zealand GST rules appears to be to design a
flexible, but GST-specific hybrid transfer pricing regime.
Australian Goods and Service Tax Ruling, GSTR 2001/6 indicates that identical or
similar “goods, services or things” can be used to determine the market price. The rule
resembles a CUP or a TVI/ TVS. However, the ruling neither indicates a firm priority between
these methods as under the GVC (although one could assume that identical supplies would take
priority over similar supplies), nor does it indicate that the taxpayer should find the “best

referenced at: Income Tax Law, No. 824 (Dec. 1974), as amended (Feb. 21, 2007) at Art. 38 (Chile). There
is nothing comparable in the Chilean VAT statute or regulations.
In similar fashion, the general rule authorizing transfer pricing adjustments in Ecuador is
contained in Article 91 of the Tax Code. It too is drafted broadly to cover all taxes:
The Government, while assessing taxes, could establish the necessary rules to regulate the transfer
pricing of goods or services for tax purposes. The exercise of this competence is applicable
exclusively in the following situations:
a) If sales are made at cost or less, unless the taxpayer can demonstrate with the proper
documents, that there were circumstances that made the goods deteriorate or that the
negotiated conditions were necessary (…)
b) When exports are made at prices inferior to those used in international markets at the
time of sale, at the first buyer level, unless the taxpayer can demonstrate with the proper
documents, that there were circumstances that made the goods to deteriorate or that the
negotiated conditions were necessary (…)
c) Costs will be regulated when imports are made at prices higher to those used in international
markets.
Tax Code, No. 1016-A (Dec. 1975), as amended (Oct. 1, 2005), at Art. 91 (Ecuador). As was the case with Chile,
transfer pricing authority is extended only to the income tax through regulations, see
Regulations to the Internal Tax Regime Law, Executive Decree No. 2209 (Dec. 2001), as amended Executive
Decree 2430 (Dec. 31, 2004) at Arts. 4 (Ecuador). However, in the case of Ecuador it is clear that the methods
adopted by the tax administration are the same as those set down in the OECD Guidelines:
For technical reference to this chapter, the Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises and Tax Administrations approved by the Organization for Economic Co-Operation
and Development (OECD) in 1995 shall be used, to the extent they are congruent with article 91
of the Tax Code, these Rulings and tax treaties signed by Ecuador.
Regulations to the Internal Tax Regime Law, Executive Decree No. 2209 (Dec. 2001), as amended Executive
Decree 2430 (Dec. 31, 2004) at Arts. 66.6 (Ecuador).
72
Roberto M. Silva Legarda, Tax Fairness Bill Released for Public Comment, 46 Tax Notes Int’l 1301 (June 25,
2007) (discussing in detail the Ecuadorian Tax Reform in income tax, VAT and excise taxes).
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method.”73 In addition, there are neither geographic preferences (similar to a place of origin rule
in the GVC) nor are there preferences for an internal over external comparables (as in GVC Art.
15(2)(e)).
A New Zealand Tax Information Bulletin explains the IRD Commissioner’s policy on
applying the open market value concept.74 Methods for determining the open market value are
provided in Section 4 of the Goods and Services Tax Act of 1985. Unlike the Australian rules
which are set out through ATO rulings, it is Section 4 of the Goods and Services Tax Act that is
the relevant instrument in New Zealand. The New Zealand statute prioritizes valuation methods.
It sets down a strict order in the use of methods (identical, then similar, and then unspecified
methods reserved for the Commissioner’s discretion). The approach of the New Zealand GST is
therefore closer to a customs, than to an income tax approach.75
The first New Zealand method is to use an identical supply (Section 4(2)). If not
successful, then a similar supply (Section 4(3)) can be used. Only then can either the taxpayer or
the government use further methods, or “… a method approved by the Commissioner which
provides a sufficiently objective approximation of the consideration in money which could be
obtained for that supply of those goods and services.” (Section 4(4)). New Zealand distinguishes
between identical and similar supplies in Section 4(1)(a).76

73

Goods and Service Tax Ruling, Goods and Services Tax: Non-Monetary Consideration, ¶¶ 144, 145 & 148-49,
GSTR 2001/6 (Nov. 28, 2001) indicates:
144. You may determine the GST inclusive market value of non-monetary consideration for a
taxable supply by applying a method that produces a reasonable GST inclusive market value of the
consideration. There will be situations where the methods used by parties differ according to their
particular circumstances. Examples of reasonable methods include:
• the market value of an identical good, service or thing;
• the market value of a similar good, service or thing; …
145. If an identical good, service or thing exists in the market, then the market value can be the
actual price of that identical good, service or thing in that market. The price of the goods, services
or things being compared needs to be representative of the market in which you are dealing. …
148. You may seek to identify a similar good, service or thing from which the GST inclusive
market value can be obtained.
149. A similar good, service or thing needs to closely resemble the good, service or thing that is
required to be valued in the first instance. It needs to be able to take the place of the original good,
service or thing and perform in a similar way. Matters that are relevant in considering the degree
of similarity include the nature of the good, service or thing, the use to which it is put, its cost,
location, size, quality and composition.
available at: http://law.ato.gov.au/atolaw/index.htm
74
New Zealand, IRD Tax Information Bulletin, Vol. 6 No. 14 at 6-8 (Jun. 1995) available at
http://www.ird.govt.nz/resources/file/ebdb0e4522c9369/tib6-14.pdf
75
The New Zealand approach could be considered as one that follows the 1979 OECD Guidelines where a similar
priority of methods can be found. If so, then the VAT transfer pricing rules are out of harmony with the income tax
rules, which follow the OECD 1995 Guidelines. This is not unusual in this area as the Canadian guidelines do the
same. See infra note 104 (discussing Canadian Customs & Revenue Agency, Transaction Value Method for
Related Persons, Memorandum D13-4-5 (April 9, 2001)).
76
A similar supply is one that, “… in respect of the characteristics, quality, quantity, functional components,
materials, and reputation of the goods and services first mentioned, is the same as, or closely or substantially
resembles, that supply of goods and services.” GOODS AND SERVICES TAX ACT, 1985 (N.Z.) at § 4(1)(a).
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Roughly harmonized – Botswana & Lesotho. A third category of harmonized VAT
statutes adopts customs methodologies, but does so without great attention to methodological
detail. The TVI/ TVS methods are copied, but other GVC-based methods are frequently
ignored.77 This pattern is common in developing economies where income tax transfer pricing
rules have not been adopted, but where customs rules are well understood and revenue from
customs is significant.
Botswana is a classic example of a jurisdiction taking a customs-based approach to
harmonization. Botswana requires the use of “fair market” valuation78 when supplies are made
to related parties. There is a very extensive definition of related parties, one that is nearly
identical to that under the GVC.79 Botswana determines the fair market value of a supply first by
comparing identical supplies,80 and if identical supplies are not available then through similar
supplies.81 This priority follows the TVI/ TVS distinction. In cases where neither of these
methods works, the statute provides that “…the fair market value shall be determined in
accordance with any method approved by the Director which provides a sufficiently objective

77

The other methods could be adopted in regulations or could simply be followed unofficially in audit practice.
VALUE ADDED TAX ACT, 2000 at 9(3)(a) & (b)(i) (Botswana).
79
VALUE ADDED TAX ACT, 2000 at Pt. 1, Art. 2. (Botswana) states:
"related persons" means (a) an individual and (i) any relative of that individual; or
(ii) a trust in respect of which such relative is or may be a beneficiary; or
(b) a trust and a person who is or may be a beneficiary in respect of that trust; or
(c) a partnership, or unincorporated association or body or close corporation and (i) any member thereof; or
(ii) any other person where that person and a member of such partnership, or unincorporated
association or body, or close corporation as the case may be, are related persons in terms of this
definition; or
(d) an incorporated company, other than a close corporation and (i) a person, other than an incorporated company, where that person or that person and a person
related to the first mentioned person in terms of this definition controls 10 percent or more of (A) the voting power in the company;
(B) the rights to distributions of capital or profits of the company, either directly or
through one or more interposed companies, partnerships, or trusts; or
(ii) any other incorporated company in which the first mentioned person referred to in subparagraph (i) or that person and a person related to that first mentioned person in terms of this
definition controls 10 percent or more of (A) the voting power in the first-mentioned company; or
(B) the rights to distributions of capital or profits of the first-mentioned company,
either directly or through one or more interposed companies, partnerships, or trusts; or
(iii) any person where that person and the person referred to in subparagraph (i) or the other
incorporated company referred to in subparagraph (ii) are related persons in terms of this
definition; or
(iv) any person related to the person referred to in sub-paragraph (iii) in terms of this definition;
(e) a registered person and a branch or division of that registered person which is separately registered
under section 46(3) as a registered person; or
(f) any branches or divisions of a registered person which are separately registered under section 46(3) as
registered persons;
80
VALUE ADDED TAX ACT, 2000 at 3(2) (Botswana).
81
VALUE ADDED TAX ACT, 2000 at 3(3) (Botswana).
78
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approximation of the consideration in money …”82 In Botswana, the Director has issued no
regulations specifying these other methods, and one assumes that this provision refers to an audit
discretion. However, the parallel construction of the statute assures that this discretion will most
likely be exercised in a manner that keeps VAT and customs valuation in harmony.
The most striking aspect of the Botswana VAT is the express link that is made between
import and non-import transactions. VAT valuation expressly parallels customs valuation. Not
only does the opening section of the definition of “fair market value” present parallel concepts of
“similar imports” and “similar supplies.”83 but the whole definition of fair market value is also
drafted in parallel form.84
The rules in the Lesotho VAT are similar, but they are set out in less detail than in
Botswana. Lesotho uses the expression “associate” to define related parties.85 Lesotho adjusts
prices between associates to “fair market value.” Like Botswana, when defining “fair market
82

VALUE ADDED TAX ACT, 2000 at 3(4) (Botswana).
VALUE ADDED TAX ACT, 2000 at 3(1) (Botswana).
In this section "similar import", in relation to an import of goods or services, means any other import of goods
or services that, in respect of the characteristics, quality, quantity, functional components,
materials, and reputation of the first-mentioned goods or services, is the same as, or closely or
substantially resembles, that import of goods or services;
"similar supply", in relation to a supply of goods or services, means any other supply of goods or
services that, in respect of the characteristics, quality, quantity, functional components, materials,
and reputation of the first-mentioned goods or services, is the same as, or closely or substantially
resembles, that supply of goods or services. (emphasis in original)
84
VALUE ADDED TAX ACT, 2000 at 3(2) – (6) (Botswana).
(2) For the purposes of this Act, the fair market value of a supply or import of goods or services at
any date shall be the consideration in money which the supply or import, as the case may be,
would generally fetch if supplied or imported in similar circumstances at that date in Botswana,
being a supply or import freely offered and made between persons who are not related persons.
(3) Where the fair market value of a supply or import of goods or services at any date cannot be
determined under subsection (2), the fair market value shall be the consideration in money which a
similar supply or similar import, as the case may be, would generally fetch if supplied or imported
in similar circumstances at that date in Botswana, being a supply or import freely offered and
made between persons who are not related persons.
(4) Where the fair market value of a supply or import of goods or services cannot be determined
under subsection (2) or (3), the fair market value shall be determined in accordance with any
method approved by the Director which provides a sufficiently objective approximation of the
consideration in money which could be obtained for that supply or import had the supply or
import been freely offered and made between persons who are not related persons.
(5) For the purposes of this Act, the fair market value of any consideration, not being
consideration in money, for a supply or import of goods or services shall be ascertained in the
same manner, with any necessary modifications, as the fair market value of a supply or import, as
the case may be, of goods or services ascertained pursuant to the foregoing provisions of this
section.
(6) The fair market value of a supply or import is determined at the time of the supply or import as
determined under this Act. (emphasis supplied).
85
SALES TAX ACT, 1995 at Art. 3 (Lesotho) states:
“associate”, in relation to a person, means any other person who acts or is likely to act in
accordance with the directions, requests, suggestions, or wishes of the first-mentioned person
whether or not they are communicated to that other person;
83
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value,” Lesotho aggregates the definition of similar import with the definition of similar
supply.86
Lesotho adopts the customs priority of TVI/ TVS, and in cases where neither of these
methods works, the statute provides that, “… the fair market value of the supply or import shall
be such amount that, in the opinion of the Commissioner having regard to all the circumstances
of the supply or import, is the fair market value …”87 The definition of taxable value of imports
expressly references the Customs and Excise Act, 1982.88 Like Botswana, the general structure
of the Lesotho statute parallels import and non-import transactions .89
No CUP or TVI/ TVS methods – Croatia & Albania. Some VAT jurisdictions do not
make adjustments for transfer prices. In these jurisdictions there is no expectation that the tax
base will conform either to CUP or TVI/ TVS valuation methodologies. As members of the
GATT these jurisdictions will adjust import prices according to GVC principles, and as a result,
an exception is included in the VAT to allow these revaluations.
The Albanian VAT strictly follows subjective valuation criteria.90 The value of a supply
is adjusted only for self supplies,91 and customs valuation on import.92 The same is true under
the Croatian VAT – subjective valuation criteria are followed93 with variation only for customs
86

SALES TAX ACT, 1995 at Art. 4(1) (Lesotho) states:
In this section, “similar supply or import”, in relation to a taxable supply or import, means a supply or import that is
identical to, or closely or substantially resembles, the first-mentioned supply or import, having regard to the
characteristics, quality, quantity supplied, functional components and reputation of; and materials comprising, the
goods or services the subject of that supply or import.
87
SALES TAX ACT, 1995 at Art. 15(3) (Lesotho). As in Botswana, the Commissioner in Lesotho has issued no
regulations specifying these methods, and one assumes that this provision refers to audit discretion.
88
SALES TAX ACT, 1995 at Art.15(1) (Lesotho).
89
SALES TAX ACT, 1995 at Art.15(2) & (3) (Lesotho).
(2) For the purposes of this Act, the fair market value of a taxable supply or an import at any date
is the consideration in money which a similar supply or import would generally fetch if supplied
or imported in similar circumstances at that date, being a supply or import freely offered and made
between persons who are not associates.
(3) Where the fur market value of a taxable supply or an import cannot be determined under
subsection (2), the fair market value of the supply or import shall be such amount that, in the
opinion of the Commissioner having regard to all the circumstances of the supply or import, is the
fair market value of the supply or import. (emphasis supplied).
90
LAW FOR VALUE ADDED TAX, No. 7928, 1995 at Art. 27(1) & (2) (Albania) states.
(1) The taxable value of a taxable supply is the total amount paid for such supply, except in cases
defined otherwise in this law.
(2) The taxable value of a supply of goods established in article 18, item 2 or item 3, is the total
payment that would have been payable relating to that supply if the aim of the supplier were to
receive a profit on that or either similar supplies.
91
LAW FOR VALUE ADDED TAX, No. 7928, 1995 at Art. 18(2) & (3) (Albania).
92
LAW FOR VALUE ADDED TAX, No. 7928, 1995 at Art. 26(3) (Albania) states:
The taxable value of imported goods is defined under Law 7609, dated 22.09.1992 “On Customs
Tariffs” despite the fact that imported goods are taxable or not with customs duties on the basis of
that law.
93
VALUE ADDED TAX ACT at Art. 8(1) (Croatia) states:
The taxable base for value added tax shall be the consideration received for goods delivered or
services performed. Consideration shall include anything that the recipient of goods or services is
required to give or pay for the goods delivered or services performed, excluding the amount of
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valuation for imported goods.94 Neither the Albanian nor the Croatian VAT have provisions for
revaluation of supplies between “related parties,” connected parties,” or “associates,” and neither
specifies any methodology for alternate valuations.
(2) Resale price method (RSP) & Deductive value method (DVM). The resale price
method (RSP) or the deductive value method (DVM) is the pricing method that best fits cases
where a reseller does not add substantial value to a supply. This is common with related-party
distributors. The method (in a sense) moves backward. It starts with the (distributor’s) resale
price to a third party, and discounts this amount by the appropriate markup to arrive at the price
for the sale between the related parties. The markup percentage is derived from an analysis of
comparable transactions between unrelated parties.
Income tax (RSP). Under both US and OECD rules the resale price method emphasizes
the comparability of functions performed, more than comparability of the products.95 As a
result, to find comparable transactions income tax methods require relatively complete
information on the functions performed, the risks assumed, and the resale contract terms of the
uncontrolled distributor.96 Internal comparables are preferred (but external comparables are
acceptable) under both US and OECD rules.97 The method is most effectively applied when the
reseller does not add valuable intangibles to the product before resale.98 Under OECD rules the
RSP is deemed more accurate when the subsequent resale of the product by the distributor occurs
shortly after the acquisition of the good from the related party.99
Customs (DVM). The deductive valuation method (DVM) in Article 5 of the GVC takes
a very similar approach, but there are differences.
The DVM has a reduced emphasis on product comparability, and a heightened concern
with functional comparability when compared with the TVI/ TVS. This shift in emphasis is
apparent when the DVM indicates that the value of “identical or similar goods” is reduced by a
margin “for profit and general expenses in connection with the sale in such country of imported
goods of the same class or kind.” By further defining goods of the same class or kind as, “…
goods which fall within a group or range of goods produced by a particular industry or industry
sector …”100 the GVC is shifting emphasis to functions. This produces a rough alignment with
the income tax preference for a functional comparability in the RSP.

value added tax. The taxable base also includes anything that any person other than the recipient
of goods or services is required to give or pay to the entrepreneur for the goods delivered or
services performed. The taxable base shall not include the amounts invoiced, received or given by
the entrepreneur in the name and for the account of another person.
94
VALUE ADDED TAX ACT at Art. 9(1) (Croatia) states:
The taxable base of imports (Article 2, Paragraph 1 Item 4) shall be the customs base established
in accordance with customs regulations, increased by the amount of customs duty, other charges
and excises payable in the course of import customs clearance.
95
Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(c)(4), at Ex. (7) and OECD, GUIDELINES supra note 2, at ¶2.18.
96
Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(c)(3)(ii)(A) and OECD, GUIDELINES supra note 2, at ¶2.21.
97
Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(c)(3)(ii)(A) and OECD, GUIDELINES supra note 2, at ¶2.15.
98
Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(c)(4), at Ex. (7) and OECD, GUIDELINES supra note 2, at ¶2.22.
99
OECD, GUIDELINES supra note 2, at ¶2.23 (there is no similar concern under the US rules).
100
GVC supra note 1, at Art. 15(3).
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Even though DVM and RSP share this emphasis, the customs rules remain more limited
than the income tax rules. For example, the customs margin can only be determined from data
obtained within the country of importation.101 Like the OECD, the GVC has an express
preference for a valuation based on “identical or similar goods [that] are sold in the condition as
imported at the earliest date after the importation of the goods being valued…” 102 However, the
GVC adds as a qualification, “… but before the expiration of ninety days after such
importation.”103
Vertical Harmonization – Income Tax RSP & Customs DVM. The harmonization of
RSP and DVM methods is far easier to imagine than is the harmonization of the CUP and TVI/
TVS methods considered earlier. RSP/ DVM differences are comparatively minor.
The more important differences are: (1) the express customs preferences for comparables
derived from the country of importation, (2) the customs requirement that comparable
transactions occur within the ninety day period after the related party transaction, and (3) the
customs preference to measure value against the normal pricing practices of an industry, or
industry sector.
In spite of the similarities between RSP and DVM, none of the thirty-three jurisdictions
with significant transfer pricing regimes in income tax directly link RSP and DVM methods in
their statutes. Customs practice does vary, and there are jurisdictions that are receptive to an
indirect linkage,104 but this is not the general rule.105 Even where indirect linking occurs, the
101

GVC supra note 1, at Art. 5(1)(a)(i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (1)(b) and (2) (each provision in Article 5 contains the
“country of importation” limitation).
102
GVC supra note 1, at Art. 5(1)(b).
103
GVC supra note 1, at Art. 5(1)(b).
104
Canadian Customs & Revenue Agency, Transaction Value Method for Related Persons, Memorandum D13-4-5
(April 9, 2001) at ¶ 15 & 16(g) available at http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/E/pub/cm/d13-4-5/d13-4-5-e.pdf. Indicating
that the CCRA will follow the RSP method for determining the transaction value under Article 1(a) of the GVC, and
as a corollary proposition roughly equating the RSP with the DVM:
15. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) published a report
entitled Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations. This
report sets out several methods of pricing goods in order to achieve a price which could reasonably
have been expected in similar circumstances had the vendor and the purchaser not been related.
These methods are illustrated in paragraph 16. The CCRA will accept, for valuation purposes, a
price paid or payable which is derived from one of the methods set out in the OECD’s report,
unless there is information on prices available which is more directly related to the specific
importations. …
16. The following methods are examples …
(g) The Canadian purchaser’s gross margin on sales in Canada of goods purchased from unrelated
suppliers is not markedly different from the gross margin percentages realized on sales of
comparable goods purchased from a related vendor. In this method, the importer may demonstrate
that the percentage gross margin earned over the landed cost of goods purchased from a related
supplier is very close to the percentage gross margin earned on comparable goods imported from
unrelated suppliers. Care would have to be exercised when using this method to ensure that the
gross margin percentage used is derived from sales where the terms of sale and marketing
conditions are basically the same. For example, it would not be realistic to compare the gross
margins realized on products advertised by the foreign vendor to the margins realized on products
where the purchaser is responsible for the cost of advertising. In addition, the purchaser’s gross
margin would have to be compared to the industry margin. (emphasis added).
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nature of this linkage is tentative, because additional customs tests must be met to align
results.106 The place where direct linkages can arise is with VAT statutes.
VAT/GST. Most VAT/GST regimes do not use either RSP or DVM methods to
determine the open market value on related party transactions – the reason is structural. Neither
of these methods takes direct aim at the VAT problem – what amount should the seller put on the
invoice? In most transactions where VAT is due it is the seller (not the buyer) who needs to
determine the tax base and record the VAT on an invoice.107 The RSP and DVM are buyercentric methods. They rely on data that is difficult for sellers to gather and analyze on a
transactional basis.108
For example, if X sells goods to Y, under RSP or DVM methods X is obliged to
determine the arm’s length price through an examination of: (1) the price that Y charges for the
resale of the goods, (2) the value that Y adds to the goods before they are resold, (3) the gross
margin that Y has on the resale of identical or similar goods purchased from independent parties
(internal comparables), and (4) the gross margin that a business comparable to Y would have on
the resale of identical or similar goods to independent parties (external comparables). Even
though X and Y are related parties, this is not easy for X. Using these methods, it is very
difficult for X to determine the price that it should place on the invoice. It is much easier for X
to determine a proper price through cost plus or constructed value methods. Under these
methods most of the data X will need will be in X’s accounting records.
Nevertheless, there are VAT/GST regimes that adopt RSP methodologies to determine
the open market value of related party transactions. These VAT regimes are the same regimes
that elected to fully harmonize with the CUP methodology considered earlier. However, there
has been some selectivity in this linkage. Some of the jurisdictions that indirectly linked VAT
and income tax CUP methods rejected a similar link with the RSP method.
This omission is replicated in the jurisdictions that adopted parallel harmonization
structures in CUP and TVI/ TVS methods. The reason seems to be that when VAT/GST
It is important to note that this example involves an internal comparable, within the same industry segment,
and within the 90 day window (probably even simultaneously with) the related party transaction.
105
US CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION, WHAT EVERY MEMBER OF THE TRADE COMMUNITY SHOULD KNOW
ABOUT: DETERMINING THE ACCEPTABILITY OF TRANSACTION VALUE FOR RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS 15-16
(Apr. 2007) available at
http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/toolbox/legal/informed_compliance_pubs/icp089.ctt/icp089.pdf (indicating
that the US recognizes similarities between income tax and customs methodologies, but also indicating that the US
will not recognize any analytical links between methodologies, other than those which the importer can
independently prove).
106
Canadian Customs & Revenue Agency, supra note 104 at ¶ 16(d) & Note (indicating that RSP-based analysis
would not be sufficient for proof of the transaction value as there would “in addition” be a requirement to “compare
to the industry margin” a requirement that derives from the definition of “goods of the same class or kind” in GVC,
Article 15(3), which concerns “goods produced by a particular industry or industry sector”).
107
Reverse charges are common in all VAT regimes, but they constitute only a small percentage of all transactions.
Under a reverse charge the buyer self-assesses the VAT.
108
It should be noted that if a reverse charge applies, then this analysis should also be reversed. In the reverse
charge instance it is the buyer not the seller who determined the VAT, and in this case the critical data on resale
prices is very available to the buyer. This would make the RSP or DVM methods very appropriate.

28

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1326454

Richard T. Ainsworth
International Network for Tax Research
12 January 2009

jurisdictions engage in thoughtful crafting of transfer pricing rules (as opposed to borrowing
them wholesale from another tax system), the difficulty of performing a RSP or DVM type of
analysis in a VAT/GST context encourages them to omit the method.
Full harmonization – Japan, Spain, Russia, Azerbaijan & Turkmenistan. Because
Japan and Spain110 harmonize directly, by simply linking the Consumption Tax and the VAT
with the methods set out in the corporate income tax, the RSP method follows through into the
VAT in both of these jurisdictions.
109

The same is true under the two-part design of the Russian tax code,111 even though the
linkage between the income tax and the VAT is indirect rather than direct. An indirect linkage
with the RSP is in place in Azerbaijan,112 and Turkmenistan.113 However, Georgia,114 a
jurisdiction that follows the two-part Russian tax code model, and which applies the CUP
method in both income tax and VAT, rejects the RSP method. The Georgian code remains fully
harmonized, because the RSP method is rejected for all taxes.
Parallel harmonization regimes – RSP & DVM omitted – Australian & New Zealand.
The VAT regimes that approach harmonization of transfer pricing methods through the careful
design of parallel provisions within the VAT generally reject the RSP or the DVM method for
the VAT. New Zealand115 and Australia116 lead in the parallel harmonization effort, and both
omit the RSP and the DVM.

109

JAPAN’S REVISED CONSUMPTION TAX LAW (SHOUHIZEIHOU), Art. 28(2) supra note 11 (indicating that the
Japanese Consumption Tax rules follow the results of the income tax) and SPECIAL TAXATION MEASURES LAW
(SOZEI-TOKUBETSU-SOCHIHOU), Art. 66-4-2-1-b (defining the resale price method [Saihanbai Kakaku Hou] for
income tax purposes).
110
Spanish Act 36/2006 of Nov. 29, 2006 amends the VALUE ADDED TAX ACT 37/1992 (Dec. 28, 1992) Art. 79.5
(providing, “For purposes of the previous two paragraphs [concerning the definition of the open market value], Art.
16 CTA [Corporate Tax Act] will be applicable, when appropriate.”) Royal Legislative decree 4/2004 (the Spanish
Corporate Tax Act) was also modified by Act 36/2006 (Nov. 29, 2006) to amend the methodologies for Spanish
transfer pricing to specifically adopt the five OECD methods.
111
TAX CODE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, Part 1, Art. 40(10), Federal Law No. 147-FZ (July 31, 1998)
(indicating that if identical or similar goods, services or works cannot be identified then a resale price method,
translated as the “price of subsequent sale method” is to be used).
112
TAX CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN, Law No. 905-IG at Arts. 14.6.3, 14.6.3.1 & 14.6.3.2 (Jul. 11, 2000)
(Azerbaijan) (indicating that after identical and similar goods [Art. 14.6.3], services or works are considered, a
resale price method [Arts. 14.6.3.1] or a cost plus method [Art. 14.6.3.2] is to be applied without a stated preference
in the order of application of RSP and C+ methods).
113
TAX CODE OF TURKMENISTAN, 2005 at Pt. 1, Sec. IV, Ch. 2, Art. 36(3) (Turkmenistan) (indicating that after
identical and similar goods, services or works are considered, a resale price method is preferred to a cost plus
method, however both resale price and cost plus methods are less preferred than an unusual/ unique “state statistics”
method described as a, “… realistic market retail price of the goods (work, services) as received from the bodies of
state statistics, …”).
114
TAX CODE OF GEORGIA, 1997 (as amended) Pt. I, Ch. 1, Art. 27(6) (setting out methods to determine the “market
price” based on identical and similar supplies, but then indicating that “…If it is impossible to use the provisions of
the 1-5 items of this Article, the market price of goods (work, service) is determined according to the rules agreed
between the "Ministry of Economy" and "Ministry of Finances.").
115
New Zealand, IRD Tax Information Bulletin, Vol. 6 No. 14 (Jun. 1995) supra note 74 at 6-8.
116
Australian, Goods and Service Tax Ruling, Goods and Services Tax: Non-Monetary Consideration, supra note
73 at ¶¶ 144, 145 & 148-49.
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No RSP or DVM methods. The vast majority of other VAT jurisdictions echo the
decision of Australia and New Zealand with respect to the RSP/ DVM methods. The reason for
this seems reasonably clear. RSP/ DVM methods are too difficult for sellers to apply in a VAT
context.
(3) Cost-plus method (C+) & Computed value method (CVM). The cost-plus (C+) and
computed value (CVM) methods seek to determine the transfer price as a multiple of the costs
incurred by the seller. It is most accurate when the seller uses very little of its own intangible
property, and assumes very little economic risk in the sale. The C+ method is a traditional
method under the US regulations117 and the OECD Guidelines.118 It is very similar to the
computed value method (CVM) under the GVC,119 which is considered “… in some ways the
simplest basis of valuation; in other ways it is the most complex and controversial.”120 Taken
together, methods modeled on C+ and CVP are the second most popular method in VAT/GST
regimes – following methods modeled after the CUP and TVI/TVS methods.
Income tax (C+). Under US and OECD rules the cost-plus method has not changed
significantly over the past 30 to 40 years. The method has two parts: (1) calculating the cost of
production, and (2) determining the gross profit percentage.121
In calculating the cost of production both US and OECD rules stress that costs need to be
determined “in a consistent manner in accordance with sound accounting practices … neither
favor[ing] nor burden[ing] controlled sales in comparison with uncontrolled sales.”122 The
OECD indicates that, “[t]he cost plus method presents some difficulties in proper application,
particularly in the determination of costs.”123
The second part, the gross profit percentage, is determined through a comparison with
comparable transactions. There is less concern with close physical product similarity when
trying to find comparable transactions,124 but there is concern with the relative value of products
involved in the transactions being compared.125 Internal comparables are preferred.126
Adjustments may be needed for differences in cost structures, business experience and relative
management efficiency.127

117

Treas. Reg. § 1.482-3(d).
OECD, GUIDELINES supra note 2, at ¶¶ 2.32 – 2.49.
119
GVC supra note 1, at Art. 6.
120
SHERMAN & GLASHOFF supra note 29, at 227.
121
Treas. Reg. § 1.482-3(d)(1); OECD, GUIDELINES supra note 2, at ¶ 2.32.
122
Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(e)(4)(ii) (1968). Essentially the same concept – following GAAP – is expressed in the
1994 regulations in cost accounting terms under the heading of “Data and assumptions – consistency in accounting”
indicating that, “the degree of consistency in accounting practices between he controlled transaction and the
uncontrolled comparables that materially affect the gross profit markup affects the reliability of the result.” Treas.
Reg. § 1.482-3(d)(3)(iii)(B) (1994).
123
OECD, GUIDELINES supra note 2, at ¶ 2.36 & 2.39.
124
Treas. Reg. § 1.482-3(d)(3)(ii)(B); OECD, GUIDELINES supra note 2, at ¶ 2.34.
125
Treas. Reg. § 1.482-3(d)(3)(ii)(B).
126
Treas. Reg. § 1.482-3(d)(3)(ii)(A); OECD, GUIDELINES supra note 2, at ¶ 2.33.
127
Treas. Reg. § 1.482-3(d)(3)(ii)(B).
118

30

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1326454

Richard T. Ainsworth
International Network for Tax Research
12 January 2009

Customs (CVM). The computed value (CVM) method is difficult to apply in a customs
context because it requires that a value be determined for imported goods (in the hands of the
importer) based on an analysis of a foreign seller’s confidential cost of production and profit
data. It is an “…unpopular method of valuation with many businessmen and customs officials
… [because] it involves the customs authorities of one country examining confidential data
regarding a business or even an industry in another country.”128
The GVC limits application of this method.129 As with the C+ method there is less
concern with comparable transactions involving identical or similar goods, or even goods of the
same class or kind,130 but there is concern with accounting consistency. The GVC avoids direct
resolution of this issue, but underscores that acceptable comparisons must conform to domestic
GAAP.131
Vertical Harmonization – Income tax C+ & Customs CVM. Vertical harmonization of
C+ and CVM methodologies is a far more comfortable proposition than the harmonization of any
of the other methodologies, although direct harmonization remains elusive. The GVC is less
restrictive in its application of the CVM than it is of the TVI/ TVS and the DVM. There is a
common concern between C+ and CVM with consistency of accounting records, reliance on
GAAP, and a preference for internal comparables. With the CVM based on the willingness of a
foreign related party to voluntarily disclose confidential cost and profit figures, it easy to see why
two of the most significant customs/ income tax cases litigated by IRS (Brittingham132 and Ross
Glove Co.133) both involve applications of customs-based (CVM) valuations to income tax (C+)
adjustments.
Once again, none of the thirty-three jurisdictions with significant transfer pricing regimes
in income tax expressly link C+ and CVM methods in their statutes. Indirect linkage however, is
evident through customs practice in several jurisdictions,134 but once again this is not the general
rule.135
128

SHERMAN & GLASHOFF supra note 29, at 233.
GVC supra note1, at Art. 6, Notes 6(1) (indicating that the CVM method will generally be restricted to related
party transactions, and not be resorted to widely to determine a substitute transaction value).
130
SHERMAN & GLASHOFF supra note 29, at 228.
131
GVC supra note1, at Art. 6, Notes 6(2).
132
Brittingham v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 373 (1976), aff’d, 598 F.2d 1375 (5th Cir. 1979).
133
Ross Glove Co. v. Commissioner, 60 TC 569 (1973), acq. in part 1974-1 CB 2.
134
Canadian Customs & Revenue Agency, supra note at ¶¶ 15 & 16(h). Indicating in a further example that the
CRA is willing to follow a C+ valuation method for determining the transaction value under Article 1(a) of the
GVC, thereby equating the C+ with the CVM:
The CCRA will accept, for valuation purposes, a price paid or payable which is derived from one
of the methods set out in the OECD’s report, unless there is information on prices available which
is more directly related to the specific importations. …
16. The following methods are examples …
(h) The vendor’s percentage of net profit on sales to the related purchaser in Canada is comparable
to the percentage of net profit realized on sales of comparable products to unrelated purchasers
located in Canada or another country, if that country’s free-market economy is comparable to the
Canadian economy.
NOTE: This method can be difficult to use and any profit comparison would have to be made with
care. This method may be used principally in cases where semi-finished products are transferred
between related companies. The use of the net profit rather than the gross profit allows a
129
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VAT/GST. VAT/GST regimes are very receptive to C+/ CVM valuation methods. This
is only to be expected. The central question in a VAT transfer pricing inquiry is: “What price
should a vendor place on his invoice?” C+/ CVM methods answer this question with data that is
in the vendor’s accounting records. This makes these methods very VAT-friendly.
Vertical harmonization efforts that involve C+/ CVP methods can be found in
jurisdictions that fully harmonize VAT methods with income tax methods in income tax, as well
as in jurisdictions draft parallel VAT rules. There are a large number of additional VAT
jurisdictions with rudimentary transfer pricing systems in place. These jurisdictions frequently
identify only a CUP or a TVI/ TVS method, and then fall-back on a rule that relies upon the
Commissioner’s (unspecified) judgment. It is expected that (in practice) a C+/ CVM method
would often be relied upon in these cases.
Fully harmonized with C+ – Japan, Spain, Russia, Turkmenistan, & Azerbaijan. The
Japanese Consumption Tax136 and Spanish VAT137 directly borrow transfer pricing methods
from the corporate income, and as a result the C+ method flows freely into the VAT in these
jurisdictions.
The same is true under the two-part design of the Russian tax code,138 and also under two
of the tax codes that follow the Russian model, those in Turkmenistan,139 and Azerbaijan.140 The

comparison without the effect of different allocations of general, selling, and administrative
expenses an of production costs in situations involving different trade levels, e.g., sales to comanufacturers versus distributors. It is recognized that problems may prevail with regard to a fair
an equitable assignment of total costs to different products. This method may well be used to
confirm the conclusions reached by other means. Complete co-operation on the part of the foreign
vendor is a pre-requisite to using this method as the documentation requirements would relate to
the vendor’s confidential costing, profit, and pricing records. Importers who are considering this
method should contact Trade Policy and Interpretation Directorate … for assistance in deciding
what documentary evidence is necessary to establish the acceptability of prices. (emphasis added).
135
US CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION, supra note 105, at 15-16 (indicating that the US recognizes similarities
between income tax and customs methodologies, but also indicating that the US will not recognize any analytical
links between methodologies, other than those which the importer can independently prove).
136
JAPAN’S REVISED CONSUMPTION TAX LAW (SHOUHIZEIHOU), Art. 28(2) supra note 11 (indicating that the
Japanese Consumption Tax rules follow the results of the income tax) and SPECIAL TAXATION MEASURES LAW
(SOZEI-TOKUBETSU-SOCHIHOU), Art. 66-4-2-1-c (defining the cost plus method [Genka Kasan Hou] for income
tax purposes).
137
Spanish Act 36/2006 of Nov. 29, 2006 amends the VALUE ADDED TAX ACT 37/1992 (Dec. 28, 1992) Art. 79.5
(providing, “For purposes of the previous two paragraphs [concerning the definition of the open market value], Art.
16 CTA [Corporate Tax Act] will be applicable, when appropriate.”) Royal Legislative decree 4/2004 (the Spanish
Corporate Tax Act) was also modified by Act 36/2006 (Nov. 29, 2006) to amend the methodologies for Spanish
transfer pricing to specifically adopt the five OECD methods.
138
TAX CODE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, Part 1, Art. 40(10), Federal Law No. 147-FZ (July 31, 1998)
(indicating that if identical or similar goods, services or works cannot be identified then a resale price method,
translated as the “price of subsequent sale method” is to be used, and then a cost-plus method, translated simply as
the “cost method”).
139
TAX CODE OF TURKMENISTAN, 2005 at Pt. 1, Sec. IV, Ch. 2, Art. 36(3) (Turkmenistan) (indicating that after
identical and similar goods, services or works are considered, a resale price method is preferred to a cost plus
method, however both resale price and cost plus methods are less preferred than an unusual/ unique “state statistics”
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only difference between these jurisdictions and the Japanese and Spanish harmonization is that
these countries accomplish this indirectly (through a third statute).
Parallel harmonization – Australia, New Zealand & Iceland. Rather than “borrowing”
methodologies from an omnibus “part 1” of the tax code, or by linking directly to another tax
statute to secure transfer pricing methodologies, Australia and New Zealand draft VAT
regulations that are parallel (but are not identical with) methods in other taxes. Iceland
accomplishes the same result through the VAT statute.141
The strength of the parallel harmonization approach is that it provides flexibility.
Language can be drafted so that a VAT/GST method will harmonize with similar methods in
both income tax and customs.142 This flexible design also allows a jurisdiction to pick-andchoose among the methodologies that will be aligned – in the case of Australia, New Zealand
and Iceland a C+ method has been selected, but not a RSP/ DVM method.143 The weakness of
this approach is that the VAT/GST valuation rules remain vague.
The Australian cost-plus method is set out in a Goods and Services Tax Ruling (GSTR
2001/6).144 The general standard to “… appl[y] a method that produces a reasonable GST
inclusive market value of the consideration.” A series of examples are presented under the
following headings:
• The market value of an identical good, service or thing;
• The market value of a similar good, service or thing;
• The market value of the supply;
• A professional appraisal.145

method described as a, “… realistic market retail price of the goods (work, services) as received from the bodies of
state statistics, …”).
140
TAX CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN, Law No. 905-IG at Arts. 14.6.3, 14.6.3.1 & 14.6.3.2 (Jul. 11, 2000)
(Azerbaijan) (indicating that after identical and similar goods [Art. 14.6.3], services or works are considered, a
resale price method [Arts. 14.6.3.1] or a cost plus method [Art. 14.6.3.2] is to be applied without a stated preference
in the order of application of RSP and C+ methods).
141
In each case (Australia, New Zealand and Iceland) the test is an objective measure of the value of the good or
service sold, not the subjective measure of the worth of the item reflected in the value of the consideration
exchanged. As a result, the rules are not applied only in a related party context. These are rules that apply as well
when the consideration is not provided in money.
142
Whether or not these VAT regimes actually do harmonize in both directions (with the income tax and customs)
cannot be determined under current law. There is no express statutory or regulatory requirement or statement of
policy that they should do so. Litigation may be necessary.
143
Georgia presents an interesting hybrid approach to the harmonization issue considered here. Georgia has adopted
a Russian-type of tax code, but has been selective in its choice of methods. It has adopted a cost plus method (like
Australia and New Zealand) but it has applied it to only income tax and VAT (because of the “two part” design of
the code). It has not adopted a resale price approach (again, like Australia and New Zealand) and thus differs from
the other Russian-type codes. TAX CODE OF GEORGIA, 1997 (as amended) Pt. I, Ch. 1, Art. 27(6) (setting out
methods to determine the “market price” based on identical and similar supplies in subsections (1) through (5), and
suggesting that a cost-plus method could be “… determined according to the rules agreed between the Ministry of
Economy and Ministry of Finances.”).
144
Goods and Service Tax Ruling, Goods and Services Tax: Non-Monetary Consideration, GSTR 2001/6 (Nov. 28,
2001).
145
Id. at ¶144.
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The next section of the GSTR is headed “Other Reasonable Methods” and indicates that a
cost-plus method is also acceptable under the general “reasonableness” standard:
Where you are making a taxable supply and you are dealing with another party at
arm’s length, you can use a reasonable valuation method as determined by you
and the other party. Also, where both the supply and the consideration are
difficult to value (for example, a forbearance may have no identifiable market),
you can calculate a reasonable market value for the non-monetary consideration
(for example, a “cost plus margin” method.146
The example that follows this description in the GSTR concludes with the following
statement of the cost-plus method:
The supply of the manufactured widgets by MegaMake is for the consideration
provided by Gus of the right to produce and sell the widgets interstate. The
widget is a new and unique item and there is no identical or similar good in the
market. MegaMake can demonstrate that it is appropriate to use a cost plus
margin method (that is, the sum of the cost of producing and a relevant profit
margin) for the production of the widgets it supplies to determine the market
value of the consideration provided by Gus.147
New Zealand sets out a cost-plus method in a Tax Information Bulletin.148 According to
the Bulletin there are three statutory methods: (1) identical supplies,149 (2) similar supplies,150
and then (3) “… a method determined by the Commissioner which provides a sufficiently
objective approximation of the consideration in money which could be obtained for that supply
of those goods.”151 The reason for the Information Bulletin is to set out the Commissioner’s
methods. It states:
Section 4(4) enables the Commissioner to approve a method the taxpayer adopts
to determine the open market value of that supply. … For example, the only
similar supply available in New Zealand may be between persons who are
associated. However, the associated persons may arrive at an open market value
based on a cost-plus method which may be acceptable to the Commissioner.
Some of the factors the Commissioner considers in approving a method to
calculate the open market value are:
• Cost of production and likely profit margin
• The demand for the goods or services and the amount of consideration
paid for similar or the same goods and services previously.152
The Icelandic VAT also relies on an objective valuation of supplies. Iceland’s VAT is
imposed on a tax base measured by the value of the good or service supplied, which includes
146

Id. at ¶155.
Id. at ¶157.
148
N.Z. INLAND REV. DEPT., TAX INFO. BUL. Vol. 6, No. 14 (June 1995).
149
GOODS AND SERVICES TAX ACT, 1985 (N.Z.) at § 4(2).
150
GOODS AND SERVICES TAX ACT, 1985 (N.Z.) at § 4(3).
151
GOODS AND SERVICES TAX ACT, 1985 (N.Z.) at § 4(4).
152
N.Z. INLAND REV. DEPT. supra note 148, at 8.
147
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even goods or services for which no consideration exchanged.153 Iceland defines the “tax price”
as follows:
The tax price is the price on which a value added tax is calculated upon the sale of
goods and valuables, taxable labor and services. The tax price refers to total
remuneration or total sales value before value added tax.154
Iceland embeds both objective (total sales value) and subjective (total remuneration)
valuation standards in its VAT statute. This allows Iceland to reach transactions where the
nature of the consideration (or lack of consideration) makes a valuation based on what is
received difficult. Related party transactions are easily brought into the Iceland VAT in this
manner. The Icelandic VAT provides:
When goods or services are exchanged or goods are handed over without charge,
the tax price shall be based upon the general price in similar transactions. Should
such a general price not be available the tax price shall be based on the calculated
sales price where account is taken of all cost plus the markup generally used for
goods and services in a similar category.155
Harmonization through the Commissioner’s (unspecified) judgment – South Africa,
Botswana, Lesotho & Uganda. There are a large number of jurisdictions that grant authority to
the Commissioner to determine an appropriate valuation methodology either generally, or on a
case-by-case basis. This authorization is normally a catch-all provision. It commonly follows
both a general policy statement on valuation and very roughly specified methods based on
identical and then similar supplies.
Given the difficulty of applying a resale price (RSP) or deductive valuation (DVM)
method in a VAT/GST context, one would expect that a cost-plus (C+) or computed value
(CVM) method would be favored in most instances, but this is not clearly stated. Jurisdictions
where this approach is taken include South Africa,156 Botswana,157 Lesotho,158 and Uganda.159
Published regulations or rulings by the Commissioner are not available in any of these
jurisdictions, suggesting that the Commissioner’s discretion is exercised on audit.
TIME
The impact of time. One of the great dilemmas in the effort to vertically harmonize
pricing conventions is how to accommodate the time-based sensitivities of the transaction153

Under the Australian rules transactions without consideration are not subject to GST [A NEW TAX SYSTEM
(GOODS AND SERVICES TAX) ACT, 1991 at para. 9-5(a)]. Transactions among related parties are an exception to this
rule, and are subject to GST based on objective valuation criteria. [A NEW TAX SYSTEM (GOODS AND SERVICES
TAX) ACT, 1991 at para. 72-10] The New Zealand GST differs, and is more like the Iceland VAT in this respect.
The New Zealand concept of supply is exceptionally broad and includes sales, gifts, leases and the provision of
goods and services. [GOODS AND SERVICES TAX ACT, 1985 (N.Z.) at §5] The New Zealand definition of
consideration is similarly broad. [GOODS AND SERVICES TAX ACT, 1985 (N.Z.) at §21)].
154
VALUE ADDED TAX ACT, No. 50 at Art. 7 (1998) (Iceland).
155
VALUE ADDED TAX ACT, No. 50 at Art. 8 (1998) (Iceland).
156
REVENUE, VALUE-ADDED TAX ACT No. 89 of 1991 at § 3(4) (South Africa).
157
THE VALUE ADDED TAX ACT, 2001 at §§ 3(4) & 9(5) (Botswana).
158
SALES TAX ACT, 1995 at Art. 15(3) (Lesotho).
159
VALUE ADDED TAX STATUTE, No. 8 at Art. 3(2) (1996) (Uganda).
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specific indirect taxes (VAT/GST and customs) with the annualized pricing determinations of the
income tax. In other words, even if we were to agree on the definition of related
parties/associated enterprises across all taxes, and even if we were to agree completely on the
precise methodologies to be applied to determine an appropriate price, how are annualized tax
base adjustments to be synchronized with day-to-day tax base calculations? The two most
important permutations of this question involve tax point variances, and the impact of audit
adjustments.
Tax point. Transaction-based indirect taxes (VAT/GST and customs) have a timespecific tax point (for example, the moment of importation or the delivery date). Aggregationbased direct taxes (the income tax) have a time-deferred tax point (for example, the due date of
the annual return). How reasonable is it to expect true price harmonization for a transaction that
is subject to tax (or contributes to the determination of aggregate tax liability) under all three
regimes?
For example, assume a specific related party transaction is entered into on January 1
(Foreign Parent Company sells X-1 to its Wholly Owned Domestic Subsidiary for 10). This
purchase is then aggregated with other inventory purchases of X (for a total value of 100,000)
and reported (as cost of goods sold) on the annual income return filed March 15 the following
year. Assume also that customs and VAT/GST also value X-1 at 10 on January 1. If this tax
system is harmonized, then it should be possible to confirm that X-1 was purchased at 10: (a) on
the customs forms submitted to the border agents; (b) on the VAT/GST invoice, and (c) as a
discrete inventory item in the cost of goods sold. Audit programs should be able to tie these
figures regardless of the starting point (income tax; VAT/GST; customs).
Audit adjustments. The audit cycle in direct taxes produces pricing adjustments many
years after specific transactions have been completed. A harmonized tax system should be able
to carry these adjustments back into prior VAT/GST and customs filings.
For example, assume that three years after the income tax return in the previous example
is filed the aggregate price for purchases of X is adjusted on audit from 100,000 to 150,000. A
harmonized tax system would require this aggregate adjustment (50,000) to be broken down
transactionally. Discrete amounts would be carried back and associated with the specific
transactions that were part of the aggregate inventory adjustment. Appropriate adjustments
should be made to invoices and amended VAT/GST and customs returns should be filed.
There are various ways to solve the allocation problem in this example. The jurisdiction
could apply: (a) a ratable allocation rule (adjusting the January 1 purchase of X-1 from 10 to 15),
or (b) a specific tracing rule (a specific adjustments could be made for the specific transactions
the price increase has been proven) or (c) a stacking rule (a formula is applied to allocated
adjustments to one category of X and then to another).
PROPOSED SOLUTION – APAs & CERTIFIED SYSTEMS
There are two aspects to the harmonization problem: (1) how to get agreement on the
valuation across all taxes, and (2) once this agreement is reached, how to adjust for harmonized
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outcomes across all the taxes. This paper argues that the best way to achieve the first objective is
through multi-tax APAs, and the best way to achieve the second is through certification of
automated systems.
It is always possible to legislate a single (vertical) solution, but this is not likely. There
are too many (horizontal) difficulties with treaties and conventions in place that have had as their
goal the horizontal harmonization of valuation rules in customs and direct taxes to make this a
workable solution in the short term.160 Although, the Canadian harmonization of direct tax,
customs and GST valuations at the border through Memorandum D13-4-5 works, it indicates
only that governments are willing to let taxpayers make an affirmative case for harmonization of
pricing formulas. The Canadian solution was both after the fact and taxpayer-specific.161
SOLUTION – THE APA PART
Could this kind of harmonization be achieved before the fact? Welcoming such a
solution would increase business certainty. Australia has in fact done this, but is waiting for
business volunteers.162 Commentary suggests that joint APA-ACR agreements should work.163
However, the tax literature does not record a large number of joint APA-ACRs. There is
one recorded instance in the US (Private Ruling HQ 546979),164 a further suggestion that French
authorities may be considering joint agreements,165 and a number of jurisdictions where multitax advance rulings on transfer pricing are “possible,” but none have been reported.166

160

There is currently a proposal to do this in South Korea. Korea Customs Service Audit Policy Bureau, Advance
Customs Valuation Agreement (ACVA) (Apr. 26, 2007).
161
It should be noted however that the Canadian approach has remained unique for twenty years. Even though
governments “should” be willing to follow the Canadian example, it does not seem like that have done so. The
reason for this is not apparent.
162
The Australian customs administration has offered to enter into joint customs-income tax-GST APAs with any
trader willing to volunteer to go through the process. In the past year no trader has stepped forward. The reason for
this is also not apparent, but may have to do with the uncertainty of being the first. “The discussions took place at
the Australian Taxation Office forum: National Taxation Liaison Group – Transfer Pricing Sub-Group, which
includes representation of relevant government agencies, peak representative groups and industry members.”
Personal e-mail communication Matthew Bannon, Acting National Manager, Maritime Operations Support,
Australian Customs Service (Dec. 22, 2008, on file with author).
163
JUAN MARTIN JOVANOVICH, CUSTOMS VALUATION AND TRANSFER PRICING: IS IT POSSIBLE TO HARMONIZE
CUSTOMS AND TAX RULES? 18 (2002).
164
Private Ruling HQ 546979 (Aug.30, 2000). See JOVANOVICH, supra note 163, at 17; Baker & Mckenzie
Transfer Pricing Annual Update--Part 2, 14 J. INT. TAX’N 26, 34 (Nov. 2003).
165
Pascal Luquet, Transfer Pricing and Customs: Two Closely Related Tax Issues 5 in a paper presented at the
WCO/OECD CONFERENCE ON TRANSFER PRICING AND CUSTOMS VALUATION, supra note 4 (and on file with author)
A question still pending is whether it would be useful or, to say the least, possible to benefit from
a certain convergence between customs and tax rules that would, in particular, include taking the
customs declaration aspect into account in any discussions that tax authorities undertake with
taxpayers in the framework of APAs. It must be noted that the French customs authorities met
with Bureau CF3 in charge of APAs in France for the first time a few weeks ago.
166
Silvain Niekel & Danny Oosterhoff, Netherlands: Compliance Agreements, 13 INT. TRANSFER PRICING J. 291
(Nov./ Dec. 2006) (discussing the new tax compliance process for large corporate taxpayers involving “compliance
agreement” (handhavingsconvenanten) that has been initiated in a pilot program with 20 large Netherlands
multinational taxpayers that has a scope broad enough to include transfer pricing issues in income tax, customs and
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This makes the decision of Thomas L. Lobred, Chief of the Value Branch of the US
Customs Service, in Private Ruling HQ 546979 the best fact-based analytical tool we have on
joint APA-ACRs. Interestingly, HQ 546979 not only identifies the problems with joint APAACRs, it resolves them in a way that is fully consistent with solution proposed in this study.
Even more interestingly, HQ 546979 demonstrates how inconsistent horizontal harmonization of
transfer pricing rules (between countries) puts pressure on businesses to find vertical
harmonization solutions (within a country). Although the US does not have a VAT/GST, if it
did one could easily imagine in this case that the VAT/GST result would be folded into the direct
tax and customs results.
Private Ruling HQ 546979
At the time of this ruling request the US’s CPM method was not accepted by the Japanese
National Tax Administration, although a Japanese Profit Split method reached similar results.
The taxpayer/ importer (Importer) in HQ 546979 seems to have been concerned that by
concluding a bilateral APA using different (US and Japanese) methods for valuing the same
goods, would create the possibility that US Customs would use this “dual methodology” to reject
the Importer’s transaction value. The APA would make the “price actually paid or payable”
appear to be ambiguous. As a result the Importer sought vertical harmonization of the US
transfer pricing rules through an ACR that was specifically related to the APA.
Facts – HQ 546979
HQ 546979 involved merchandise imported to the US from related-party suppliers. The
Importer was a US corporation that acted as a wholesale distributor of products for household
and commercial use in the US market. Products were imported from two related suppliers.
The Importer filed a request for an APA with the IRS and the Japanese tax authorities.
The APA request contained an analysis of two different transfer pricing methodologies: (1) the
CPM and (2) the Japanese profit-split method.
The Importer subsequently attended an APA pre-filing conference with the IRS and
requested that a member from Customs participate in it. The Importer provided Customs with
access to information regarding the application of the CPM, and enabled Customs to review: the
selection of the tested party under the APA;
• how the comparable companies were selected;

VAT); Stephan Schnorberger, Germany: Same Procedure as Last year? Competent Authority Procedures and
Advance Pricing Agreements Revisited,14 INT. TRANSFER PRICING J. 109, 113 (Mar./Apr. 2007)
Whereas a competent authority agreement is immediately implemented in domestic tax
assessments, the implementation of an APA, from a German perspective, relies on a binding
advance ruling which is issued by the local tax office in accordance with the principles of the
intergovernmental agreement. This binding advance ruling obligates the competent tax office to
assess tax in line with the content of the international agreement. The binding ruling may cover
subjects other than transfer pricing and permanent establishments, such as capital gains taxation,
the tax treatment of restructuring transactions, and the VAT treatment of a particular transaction.
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•
•
•
•
•

the determination of financial results related to the controlled or tested
transactions;
the selection of the years for comparison;
the accounting adjustments made to the comparable companies' and the Importer's
financial data;
the selection of the most reliable profit-level indicator for use under the CPM; and
capital adjustments and the use of the interquartile range.

The APA was signed by the IRS in March 2000, and the competent authorities of the US
and Japan executed a mutual agreement that was consistent with the APA. As is usually the
case, the APA contained a compensating adjustment clause. The ACR noted this as follows:
Further, pursuant to paragraph 7 of the APA, if the Importer's actual transactions
are not in compliance with the TPM described above, the Importer's taxable
income must nevertheless be reported in an amount consistent with the TPM and
the requirements of the APA. Thus, the Importer may make what are referred to
in the IRS revenue procedures as "compensating adjustments." Compensating
adjustments are a means of allowing a taxpayer to retroactively account for any
differences between actual transactional results and true arm's length results, in
this case arm's length results that are defined in the APA.167
Importer’s Argument & Custom’s Rejection – HQ 546979
The Importer argued that it was not necessary for US Customs to analyze the transaction
value because the APA (and the information made available to Customs through the APA
proceedings) demonstrated that the relationship of the buyer and seller did not influence the
price.
Customs rejected the Importer’s argument. The ACR stated that the APA’s analysis was
not sufficiently granular for Customs purposes. This is a position the US has not modified.168
The ACR states:
167
168

Private Ruling HQ 546979 (Aug.30, 2000) at 2.
US CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION 16 (2007) supra note 105 indicates:
CBP recognizes that in some cases, the underlying facts and the conclusions reached in
an APA or transfer pricing study may contain some relevant information about the circumstances
of sale and thus may be considered in applying the circumstances of sale test. For example, they
may contain pertinent information about how the related parties transact business and may include
information about sales of similar products to unrelated purchasers. The weight given to the facts
and conclusions in an APA or transfer pricing study depends in large part on the particular
circumstances presented and the transfer pricing methodology used. For example, an APA that is
based on the comparable uncontrolled price method (CUP) has the most relevance for customs
valuation purposes and would be given much more weight than an APA that is based on the
comparable profits method (CPM), which generally has the least relevance for customs valuation
purposes.
In addition to the methodology used, other relevant considerations are whether the
transfer pricing study has been considered by the IRS, whether the APA is bilateral or unilateral,
and whether the products covered by the study are comparable to the imported products at issue.
See, HRL 548095, September 19, 2002; HRL 547672, May 21, 2002; and, HRL 546979, August
30, 2000. If an importer believes that any information or finding contained in an APA or transfer
pricing study is relevant to the application of the circumstances of sale test, it is up to the importer
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[The] Customs approach to related party transactions differs from the IRS approach.
Specifically, the methods [CPM and Japanese profit split] review profitability on an aggregate
basis, not a product by product basis. … in the Prefiling Submission to the IRS, the Importer
stated that to establish a range at a less aggregate level, allocations of its profit and loss statement
and balance sheet would have to be undertaken to analyze each product division individually …
(emphasis added)169
Custom’s Solution: Resolving the Granularity & Timing Issues – HQ 546979
But HQ 546979 does not end with a simple rejection of the Importer’s petition. Because
Customs did not view a product-by-product analysis to be a difficult hurtle to overcome, Mr.
Lobred went on to explain how the facts of the present case were sufficient to satisfy the
“circumstances-of-the-sale” test.170 Mr. Lobred indicated that the required product-by-product
analysis was something that could be done within the confines of the current APA.
… all the Importer’s imported products are covered by the APA. Thus,
[Customs] will not require the Importer to provide Customs with a further
breakdown of product line profitability for comparability purpose. However,
Customs expects that in any future verification, the Importer will be able to show
Customs that the profit earned by product line falls within the agreed upon range
specified in the APA.171
In other words, all that is needed as a general matter is a reasonable formula that allocates profit
among the product lines. It may not be necessary for an APA to be granular, but it is necessary
for an ACR to be granular. Customs and an ACR are concerned with a transactional (not an
aggregate) tax base.
The final concern of the ACR was the compensating adjustment required by the APA.
Because these adjustments have a direct bearing on customs value the ACR indicated,
… if the importer must make compensating adjustments to comply with
paragraph 7 of the APA, the adjustment must be reported to Customs
immediately, and any additional duties resulting from the adjustments must be
tendered to Customs.172
In other words, under the ACR the Importer would have to agree to make adjustments to the
transaction value as and when those adjustments were being made on the income tax side.
SOLUTION – THE CERTIFIED SYSTEMS PART

to identify that information, explain why it is relevant, and submit supporting documentation to
CBP. If the importer simply submits a copy of an APA or transfer pricing study without further
explanation and documentation, the circumstances of sale claim will be rejected.
169
Id. at 10-11.
170
§402(b)(2)(B) of the Tariff Act (1930), as amended by the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (19 U.S.C. 1401a);
GVC supra note1, at Art. 2(a).
171
Private Ruling HQ 546979 (Aug.30, 2000) at 11-12.
172
Id. at 12-13.
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The full solution is not simply a multi-tax APA. More is needed. It is reasonably clear
that a serious barrier to vertical harmonization of transfer pricing rules in direct taxes and
VAT/GST (and customs) has to do with timing as well as granularity.
Direct tax valuations are completed much later in time than VAT/GST and customs
regimes are comfortable with. Transaction taxes are designed around having either a set number
or a fixed formula that will objectively determine the tax base. Certified systems, software
programs that are certified as part of the APA process, have the fixed formula that provides the
adjusted tax base numbers that transaction taxes need. The formula, embedded in the taxpayer’s
VAT and customs software, linked through the ERP to the financial statements and the direct tax
return can be designed to determine the granular adjustments that transaction tax auditors need.
A certified system would go one step further. It would file amended VAT/GST and customs
returns based on this formula.
Thus, what is proposed is for an IT-APA (Information Technology – Advance Pricing
Agreement). Reaching an IT-APA agreement is in essence the certification of the tax software of
an enterprise. Certification means – the determination by the tax administration that the software
(absent fraudulent use): (a) accurately records the determination of transfer prices [based on the
application of methods agreed to elsewhere in the APA]; (b) properly calculates VAT/GST and
customs duties based on these values; (c) automatically files all tax documentation; (d)
authoritatively interfaces with financial reporting systems and the pricing elements of the income
tax; (e) adjusts all invoices, tax reports and returns for pricing decisions made later in time; and
(f) file the related returns, reports and schedules based on these adjustments along with remission
of additional taxes due, plus interest an applicable penalties.
It is expected that concessions on penalties, the kinds of adjustments possible, later filing
of amended returns, and even some linkages among transfer pricing regimes will only be
available to businesses that enter into an IT-APA. Only these enterprises will be able to assure
governments that the necessary balancing of compliance obligations (among income tax,
customs and VAT/GST regimes) has been accomplished – short of a full blown three-tax audit.
Taxpayers that do not secure an IT-APA will benefit from the conscious efforts of the tax
administration to further harmonize income tax, customs, and VAT rules – a necessary activity
when tax administrations are actively engaged in negotiating IT-APAs. However, these
taxpayers will have no assurance that their returns will be accepted as accurate on all pricing
issues (immediately on filing), and will likely encounter a more highly cross-checked audits.
Adopting an IT-APA will be a matter of taxpayer choice. But if the model of the
American Streamlined Sales Tax (SST)173 is considered, and if third party certified service
providers (CSPs) enter the tax compliance market as they have in the US, then certified
solutions, and the IT-APA, will be readily available, at low cost, and with on-line access.

173

Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement (SSUTA) (adopted November 12, 2002, amended November 19, 2003
and further amended November 16, 2004) available at http://www.streamlinedsalestax.org.
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